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Comment
COPING WITH THE PARTICULARIZED PROBLEMS OF TOXIC
TORT LITIGATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The Manville Corporation,' a building materials conglomerate, was
ranked 181st on the 1982 Fortune 500 list of America's largest industrial
corporations.2 It was also one of thirty companies included in the Dow
Jones industrial average, 3 and had reported on a recent financial statement a
net worth of $1.1 billion.4 On August 26, 1982, however, Manville filed for
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act.5 Manville
sought protection of Chapter 11 because it anticipated the cost of future
asbestos litigation would exceed its assets. Since 1968 Manville had been
named as a defendant in approximately 20,000 asbestos personal injury law-
suits and had paid out fifty million dollars in claims. 6 Experts predicted that
Manville could expect about 500 new asbestos-related injury suits per
month, for an eventual total of 52,000 claims. 7 Furthermore, it was pre-
dicted that each claim would cost Manville an average of $40,000 to han-
1. The Manville Corporation is a Denver-based materials and forest products
conglomerate. It has also been for some time the nation's largest producer of asbes-
tos. An Asbestos Bankruptcy, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6, 1982, at 54 [hereinafter referred to as
Bankruptcy]. Until 1981, the Manville Corporation was known as the Johns-Manville
Corporation. Manville's Bold Maneuver, TIME, Sept. 6, 1982, at 17 [hereinafter referred
to as Maneuver].
Asbestos is a fibrous mineral which is known for its heat-resistant and insulating
properties. Mehaffy, Asbestos-Related Lung Disease, 16 FORUM 341, 341 (Winter 1980).
Because asbestos does not burn, it is used to insulate pipes and machinery, to line the
walls of buildings, and to make fire-resistant materials. See Manuever, supra. During
the past 15 years, asbestos has also been recognized as a major occupational health
hazard because it causes severe lung disease. Id
2. Manuever, supra note 1.
3. Id The Dow Jones Industrial average is an indicator of prices on the New
York Stock Exchange. See id.
4. Bankruptcy, supra note 1. In 1981, Manville showed a profit of $60.3 million
from sales of $2.2 billion. Maneuver, supra note 1.
5. Bankruptcy, supra note 1. The purpose of a business reorganization under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act is to restructure a business' finances so that it may continue
to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for
its stockholders. A. COHEN, BANKRUPTCY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND OTHER
DEBTOR-CREDITOR MATTERS 14-501, at 265 (1981). For a full discussion about
the implications of filing for reorganization under Chapter 11, see 1d. See generally A.
COHEN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1978
(1979).
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die,8 and would subject the firm to a potential aggregate liability in excess of
two billion dollars. 9
The Manville move dramatized the fact that this nation must come to
grips with the dilemma created by the voluminous number of personal in-
jury cases resulting from exposure to toxic substances.10 Environmental dis-
eases are unquestionably tragic for the victims and their families, and there
is a public policy interest that those injured should be compensated. On the
other hand, companies face billions of dollars of potential liability, and per-
haps even bankruptcy, for decisions made long ago. Yet, at present there is
no consistent answer regarding who should be ultimately responsible for this
enormous liability expense, or what should be done to minimize the risk of
bankruptcy for companies which are charged such costs.
This comment will delineate the scope of the toxic tort problem, ad-
dressing both procedural'I and substantive' 2 issues raised in cases based on
exposure to toxic substances, and will focus on the varied treatment of those
issues in our nation's courts. The most disturbing problems which plague
toxic tort litigation involve the identification of defendants, applicability of
statutes of limitation and repose, use of collateral estoppel, and the extent of
an insurer's liability. This comment will explore each of these problems and
examine the judicial and legislative responses to them. 13 Reference will be
made to two representative toxic products, diethylstilbestrol (DES) 14 and
asbestos,' 5 to illustrate the nature of the dilemma, since these two substances
8. Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 55; Maneuver, supra note 1. The estimated cost of
handling an asbestos-related injury claim was $40,000 even though Manville was
winning 40% of the cases tried. Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 55.
9. Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 55; Maneuver, supra note 1.
10. It is difficult to define a toxic substance because of the variety of materials
which may be harmful to the health of humans. F. McGovern, Toxic Substances in
Litigation in the Third Circuit, at n.I (available on reserve Pulling Library, Villanova
University School of Law). The Virginia legislature, for example, has broadly de-
fined the term as "any substance . . . that has the capacity, through its physical,
chemical or biological properties, to pose a substantial risk of death or impairment
either immediately or overtime (sic), to the normal functions of humans." Id. (quot-
ing VA. CODE § 32.1-239(d) (1979)).
11. For a discussion of procedural issues, such as those concerning statutes of
limitation and repose, and the use of collateral estoppel, see notes 103-28 and accom-
panying text infra.
12. For a discussion of substantive issues, such as the identification of defendants
and insurance problems, see notes 20-82 and accompanying text infa.
13. For a general discussion of legislative attempts to deal with these problems,
see notes 72-82, 99-101 & 161-76 and accompanying text ifra.
14. DES is a synthetic estrogen that doctors prescribed from 1941 to 1971 to
prevent miscarriages in pregnant women. Vagley & Blanton, Aggregation of Claims:
Liability for Certain Illnesses with Long Latency Periods Before Maniestation, 16 FORUM
636, 639 (1980). For a full discussion of DES and its harmful effects, see notes 35-41
and accompanying text infa. For an outstanding comment on the properties of DES
and on the factual, legal, and policy issues involved in DES cases, see Comment, DES
and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 963 (1978).
15. Asbestos-caused lung diseases can be divided into malignant and non-malig-
nant varieties. Insurance Co. of N.Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 451 F. Supp. 1230,
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have been involved in much of the litigation regarding toxic torts.16
The enormity of the toxic tort problem, however, cannot fully be under-
stood without recognizing that hundreds of chemicals used in our society are
toxic, 17 thereby creating potential health problems and causes of action for
millions of consumers. 18 These toxic time bombs may result in a flood of
1236 (E.D. Mich. 1978). Asbestosis is a non-malignant form of lung disease which
results from the inhalation over a considerable period of time of asbestos fibers. Id.
Asbestos fibers of a certain length often become embedded in lung tissue in areas
where the alveoli-the air pockets of the lungs-are located, and where the transfer
of gases in and out of the blood takes place. Id The body reacts by walling off these
particles, producing a dense scar-like material in the functional area of the lungs. Id
Each repitition of inhalation and walling off of asbestos fibers causes the formatign of
a scar-like tissue. Id Eventually this scar-like tissue decreases the functional volume
of the lungs and impedes the transfer of gases in and out of the blood. Id. Eventu-
ally, the functional capacity of the lungs may become too limited to support life. Id
at 1236-37. Although damage to the lungs caused by asbestosis begins with the initial
imbedding of the asbestos fiber, in the majority of these cases diagnosable symptoms
do not appear until approximately 20 years after exposure. Id. at 1237.
Mesothelioma, a second asbestos-caused disease, is a malignant condition of cells
which line the chest wall. d A tumor eventually grows after a latent period of over
20 years. Id. In most cases, death results within two years of the tumor's appearance.
Id. The third form of asbestos-related disease which is also malignant, is
bronchogenic carcinoma or lung cancer. Id It has a latent period of 15 to 20 years.
Id
For a full discussion of asbestos-related lung disease, see Mehaffy, supra note 1, at
341. See also Note, Asbestos-Related Diseases Trigger Insurer's Duty to Defend and Indemnify
When the Diseases Become Reasonably Capable of Diagnosis, 28 VILL. L. REv. 1335 (1983).
16. See Vagley & Blanton, supra note 14, at 647-48. Each year as many as
2,522,000 workers are exposed to products containing asbestos and thus are at risk of
contracting an asbestos-related disease. NATIONAL CANCER INST. ASBESTOS: AN IN-
FORMATION RESOURCE (1978). One study predicts that, until the year 2000, there
will be 20,000 asbestos-related deaths each year in the United States. Id at 647 (cit-
ing Address by I. Selikoff to the Delegates of the Twenty-First Convention of the
International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers (Sept.
1967)). It is also estimated that total payments of damages for asbestos exposure will
range from $9.3 to $25.6 billion during the period from 1977 to 1995. Id. As of
August 27, 1982, the Manville Corporation alone was faced with 16,500 asbestos-
related injury claims. Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
In contrast, the potential liability for DES-related illnesses is smaller. Vagley &
Blanton, supra note 14, at 647-48. It is estimated that only between one in 250 and
one in 1000 of the 1.1. to 2.2 million women exposed to DES in utero will develop
adenocarcinoma, a form of cancer which has been linked to DES. Id at 647-48. In
fact, by 1980 fewer than 250 DES-related cancers had been diagnosed. See Philadel-
phia Inquirer, March 11, 1983 at 1 1-A, col. 1 (quoting urologist Grannum R. Sant of
Tufts-New England Medical Center). Since DES use reached its peak in the early
1950's and DES-related injuries usually have a 19 year latency period, the majority of
DES-related injuries should have manifested themselves by 1977. Vagley & Blanton,
supra note 14, at 639, 648. The awards and settlements in the DES cases have aver-
aged around $171,000. Vagley & Blanton, supra note 14, at 648.
17. Toxic Time Bombs, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6, 1982, at 57. The Occupational
Safety and Health Administration has developed a list of 200 toxic chemicals that
may pose problems to industrial workers. Consequently, the asbestos cases may just
be a portent of an impending deluge of toxic tort claims. Id
18. Comment, Occupational Carcinogenesis and Statutes of Limitation: Resolving Rele-
vant Policy Goals, 10 ENVTL. L. 113, 113 n.1 (1979). During the time Congress was
3
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toxic tort litigation with its particularized problems,' 9 and may require the
creation of innovative legal theories.
II. RECENT CHANGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
Products liability law is over a century old,20 but since 1960 the field
has witnessed significant conceptual developments. 2' Most of these recent
considering the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, it had
reports that every twenty minutes a new and potentially dangerous toxic chemical
was introduced into industry. Id Furthermore, it was reported that on an annual
basis 800 persons had been killed and 80,000 injured from improper use of pesticides
alone. Id.
In addition to asbestos-related diseases, other occupational diseases include bys-
sinosis or "brown lung" disease which is caused by the inhalation of cotton dust,
pneumoconiosis or "black lung" disease which miners often contract, cadmium
poisoning, noise pesticide poisoning, betanapthylamine exposure, and radiation
poisoning. Id
For a discussion of the incidence of asbestos-related disease and DES-related
illnesses, see note 16 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of black lung
disease and the legal issues involves, see Black Lung Symposium, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 721
(1981).
19. See McGovern, supra note 10, at 2-4. Though toxic tort litigation is a species
of product liability litigation and therefore shares many of the characteristics of such
litigation, the peculiar nature of a toxic tort creates specialized problems. Id at 2.
For example, toxic substances potentially expose an enormous number of persons to
harm. Id There is generally involved a considerable time lag between the act of a
manufacturer in producing a defective product and the discovery of an injury to a
consumer. Id Furthermore, the proof of injury from toxic substances may be ex-
tremely difficult because of the high degree of scientific uncertainty concerning the
nature and extent of harm caused by the product. Id. at 2-3.
Due to the large number of plaintiffs and defendants in cases involving toxic
substances, there are often mechanical problems of case management which have
resulted in class actions, new techniques of managing discovery and trial, and new
methods of organizing representation of clients and dealing with conflicts of interest.
Id Professor McGovern maintains that these unique problems stem from the nature
of injuries caused by toxic substances. Id He states that "there are simply no historic
legal theories or particularistic proof available for some types of injuries." Conse-
quently, he points out, "[C]ourts are being asked to develop new theories of liability,
to relax standards of proof, to circumvent existing bars to recovery, and to follow new
indices for damages." Id. at 4 (footnotes omitted).
20. Note, Indausty- Wide Liability and Market Share Allocation of Damages, 15 GA. L.
REV. 423, 423 (1981). Winterbottom v. Wright, an English case involving a plaintiff
who was injured while riding in a mailcoach, is generally recognized as the formal
beginning of products liability law. Id (citing Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W.
109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842)). For further discussion of products liability law prior
to 1960, see James, Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 44 (1955); Noel, Manufacturers of
Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REV. 963 (1957); Prosser, The
Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
21. These recent developments in this area of law are discussed extensively in
products liability literature. For a list of recent works dealing with products liability,
see generally AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, TORT REFORM AND RELATED PROPOS-
ALS--ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHIES ON PRODUCT LIABILITY AND MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE (B. Levin & R. Coyne ed. 1979); Products Liability Law, 73 LAW LIBR. J. 958
(1981).
The federal government has also attempted to reform existing tort law as it ap-
plies to product liability. In 1979, the Interagency Task Force of the Commerce
1982-831 COMMENT 1301
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developments have greatly increased the exposure to liability of products'
manufacturers and sellers of products to liability. For example, in 1960 in
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. ,22 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
abandoned the requirement of privity of contract between a plaintiff and
defendant as a prerequisite to recovery in a products liability case against an
automobile manufacturer.23 Two years later, the California Supreme Court
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. ,24 established the rule that a manufac-
turer is strictly liable in tort for injuries caused by defects in its product.2 5 In
1964, the American Law Institute bolstered the effect of Greenman when it
drafted section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts. 26 Section 402A
held a manufacturer strictly liable in tort for injuries caused by products
Department, under the leadership of Victor E. Schwartz, drafted the Model Uniform
Product Liability Act (UPLA). See Hollenshead, Historical Perspective on Product Liabil-
ity Reform, 1 J. PRODUCT L. 75 (1982). The act, designed to be adopted voluntarily
by the states, had been enacted by only two states as of 1982. Special Project, Student
Forum on the Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 111 (1980); Hol-
lenshead, supra, at 87. For a fuller discussion of the UPLA, see generally Special
Project, supra. See also notes 170-76 and accompanying text infra.
For a concise discussion of the evolution of products liability law, see generally
Hollenshead, supra.
22. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
23. Id The Henningsen case involved injury to a consumer which resulted from a
defect in an automobile. Id. at 364, 161 A.2d at 73. The consumer attempted to sue
both the auto manufacturer and the dealer. However, since the consumer did not
purchase the automobile directly from the manufacturer, who always dealt through a
middleman, no privity of contract existed between the consumer and the manufac-
turer. Id at 364, 373, 161 A.2d at 73, 77. The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected
the manufacturer's lack of privity defense and held that the obligation of the manu-
facturer should not be based solely upon privity of contract, but should also rest upon
the demands of social justice. Id at 373, 161 A.2d at 77. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that an automobile manufacturer is liable to the ultimate purchaser because
of an implied warranty of merchantability. Id at 377-78, 161 A.2d at 80.
24. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
25. Id. The Greenman case was brought by a consumer who was injured by an
electric tool. Id at 59, 377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698. Justice Traynor, writ-
ing for the California Supreme Court, allowed a strict liability cause of action against
the manufacturer because he felt that the costs of injuries resulting from defective
products should be borne by the manufacturers, rather than by injured consumers
who are powerless to protect themselves. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at
701. The Greenman court found the existence of an implied warranty to be immate-
rial, and concluded that in order to recover from the manufacturer the plaintiff only
had to show that he was using the product in a manner for which it was intended and
was injured "as a result of a defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was
not aware that made the product unsafe for its intended use." Id at 64, 377 P.2d at
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1975). Section 402A reads in
its entirety as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if:
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
1302 [Vol. 28: p. 1298
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which it sold "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer or to his property."'27 The abandonment of the privity require-
ment and the subsequent shift to strict liability represented a change in the
philosophy underlying the law of torts.2 8 It foreshadowed the trend of some
modern courts to find liability without requiring the plaintiff to prove
causation.
29
III. IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANTS
While courts began to endorse this plaintiff-oriented philosophy, they
still embraced the basic premise that a manufacturer was liable only for its
own product.30 Consequently, a traditional requisite in a products liability
case was the plaintiff's identification of the manufacturer or seller of the
product which caused the harm or injury. 3 1 However, in recent cases involv-
ing latent diseases or injuries which have developed over long periods of time
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although:
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not brought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id
27. Id.
28. Hollenshead, supra note 21, at 81. Instead of focusing on the most equitable
way of distributing the loss as between the two parties, some courts began to look for
the most efficient way of spreading the losses generally. Id
29. For a discussion of liability without causation, see notes 64-67 and accompa-
nying text infra.
30. Gillick, The Essence of Enterprse Liability, or The True Meaning of "We're All in
This Together," 16 FORUM 979 (1980-81). See generally Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 1344
(1973).
31. See, e.g., Kinsey v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 137 Ga. App. 681, 225 S.E.2d 96
(1976). Kinsey involved an action against a bottler for injuries suffered from drinking
a bottle of Coca-Cola containing glass particles. Id. at 682, 225 S.E.2d at 97. Al-
though the store from which the plaintiff purchased the bottle was within the defend-
ant's distribution area, the store also obtained bottles from other bottlers. Id at 682,
225 S.E.2d at 97. Consequently, since there was no proof that the defective bottle
had been manufactured by the defendant, the appellate court upheld the trial court's
grant of a directed verdict for the defendant. Id at 682, 225 S.E.2d at 97. See also W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 236 (4th ed. 1971) ("there
must be some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant
and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered").
One of the characteristics of toxic tort litigation is that the range of potential
defendants may be enormous. Professor Francis McGovern notes:
Suits involving a definable product may include manufacturers, suppliers,
wholesalers, commercial carriers, packagers, advertisers, endorsers,
franchisors and franchisees, fabricators, storers, retailers and others. Expo-
sure to industrial toxic substances may impose liability upon an entire in-
dustry, an area of industry, architects, contractors, maintainers, owners of
land and an endless variety of providers of services. Employees exposed to
toxic substances may bring suit against insurance, union, plant, government
and private inspectors, co-employees, product suppliers and manufacturers,
contractors, architects and employers. Health care providers such as doc-
tors, hospitals, clinics, nurses and pharmacists are also potentially liable.
1982-831 COMMENT 1303
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because of a defect in some generic, fungible product that could have been
produced by any of a number of manufacturers, plaintiffs' counsel have
sought to avoid even this basic requirement. 32 This recent departure from
traditional causation rules33 in products liability law has developed largely
within the confines of cases involving DES. The DES cases which circum-
vent traditional rules of causation all share the basic premise that a plaintiff
should not be precluded from recovering damages caused by fungible goods
even though she cannot identify the specific source of harm.
34
DES first entered the marketplace in 1947 as a product used to prevent
miscarriages in pregnant women. 35 It is estimated that as many as three
hundred different companies manufactured DES36 before the Food and
Drug Administration in 1971 banned its use by pregnant women because of
the high incidence of vaginal cancer in the daughters of DES users.37 These
Federal, state and local governments and their employees may not be im-
mune from suit.
Once defendants are sued, they typically seek contribution or indem-
nity from an equally large variety of parties. Federal, state and local gov-
ernments, entire industries, and other producers of an allegedly defective
product may be joined. For example, manufacturers and sellers of asbestos
who have been sued by individual plaintiffs for causing asbestosis have filed
third party actions against both the United States Government and the
entire tobacco industry.
McGovern, supra note 10, at 13-14 (footnotes omitted). Given the large number of
potential defendants in a typical toxic tort case, the plaintiff under traditional rules
of causation bears the heavy burden of identifying the appropriate defendants. Re-
sponding to the potential inequity of this heavy burden, courts have recently at-
tempted to ease the plaintiffs burden in toxic torts cases. For a discussion of various
theories courts have used to relieve plaintiffs from the burden of identifying the ap-
propriate defendants, see notes 42-67 and accompanying text thfra.
32. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). For a discussion of Sthdell, see notes
64-67 and accompanying text infra.
33. See Note, supra note 20, at 425 (noting that at least one court has allowed the
plaintiff to shift the burden of identification to the defendants).
There are three elements of causation in products liability suits: "(1) the plain-
tiff must have been injured by the product; (2) the product must have been defective,
i.e., unreasonably unsafe; and (3) the defect must be traced to the defendant." Id at
424 (citing 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16 A[4][e][i], at
3B-88-88.1 (1980)); W. PROSSER, supra note 31, § 103, at 671-72.
34. For a discussion of these theories which ease a plaintiffs burden in proving
causation, see notes 42-67 and accompanying text infta. Recent medical evidence
suggests that the sons of mothers who took DES during their pregnancy might de-
velop testicular cancer. Philadelphia Inquirer, March 11, 1983, at 11 -A, col. 1. DES
has also been linked to urogenital abnormalities in the sons of women who took this
drug. Id
35. Comment, supra note 14, at 963. See also Fischer, Products Liability-An Analy-
sis of Market Share Liabi'ly, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1623 (1981); Note, Market Share Liability:
An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARV. L. REV. 668, 668-69 (1981). DES is
a drug composed of synthetic estrogen. Vagley & Blanton, supra note 14, at 639.
36. Comment, supra note 14, at 964 n.3. See also Fischer, supra note 35, at 1625.
37. Comment, supra note 14, at 965-66. DES appears to have no adverse affect
on the mothers who ingested the drug. Dworkin & Zollers, Market Share Liabilty-
Proposalsfor Application, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 523, 524 (1981).
1304 [Vol. 28: p. 1298
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daughters are now plaintiffs in approximately one hundred pending
lawsuits.
38
The common thread running through most DES cases is that the
daughters are unable to identify which company manufactured the DES in-
gested by their mothers.39 This identification problem has arisen for two
reasons: first, the effects of DES do not surface for a minimum of ten to
twelve years after ingestion;40 and second, there was a lapse of time before
DES was recognized as the cause of cancerous and pre-cancerous condi-
tions.4 1 Courts have developed various theories to relieve plaintiffs from the
burden of identifying the proper defendant, thus entitling DES victims to
compensation that would have been denied under traditional product liabil-
ity theories.
The earliest attempt to ease the plaintiff's identification problem re-
sulted in the expansion of two traditional tort theories. The first is the alter-
native liability theory, which typically arises when one of two or more
tortfeasors causes harm to a plaintiff. The classic fact situation is found in
the 1948 case of Summers v. l ie, 4 2 where a plaintiff was injured during a
hunting trip when two companions negligently fired their guns simultane-
ously in his direction. 43 The plaintiff in Summers was able to establish that
his injuries resulted from the negligence of one of the defendants. He was,
however, unable to prove which one of the defendants had fired the shot
which had caused his injury. 44 The alternative liability doctrine allows the
plaintiff to shift the burden of proof to the defendants to establish which of
them caused the alleged harm.
45
38. Comment, supra note 14, at 966-67. Although there are an estimated
500,000 DES daughters, only a small number are suffering from potentially fatal
clear-cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina and uterus. Id at 964-65. See note 16supra.
The majority of DES daughters have only contracted such pre-cancerous abnormali-
ties as adenosis. Id. at 695.
39. Dworkin & Zollers, supra note 37, at 524.
40. Id. Often because of the passage of a number of years, memories have faded
and prescription records have been lost. See Note, supra note 35, at 670. Further
complicating the search for the specific manufacturer is the fact that, since the drug
was fungible, pharmacists often substituted one brand of DES for another. Dworkin
& Zollers, supra note 37, at 524. See also Kroll, Intra-Industlyoth Liability: The Era of
Absolute Products Liability, 1980 INS. L.J. 185, 187.
41. See Comment, supra note 14, at 963-64.
42. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
43. Id at 82-83, 199 P.2d at 2-3.
44. Id at 83, 199 P.2d at 3.
45. McGovern, supra note 10, at 15.
The Summers court found that a requirement which shifts the burden of proof to
the defendants was necessary to avoid unfairness to the plaintiff. 33 Cal. 2d at 86,
199 P.2d at 4. The court further noted that the defendants were in a better position
than the plaintiff to offer evidence to determine which one caused the harm. Id
The Second Restatement of Torts has adopted the Summers result. It states in
relevant part as follows:
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved
that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is
1982-83] COMMENT 1305
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Some courts have applied this theory in DES cases in order to shift the
burden of proof of identification to the defendants.46  It is questionable,
though, whether the alternative liability theory should be used with DES
cases because the factual situation of Summers and the facts of a typical DES
case differ in several major respects. 4 7 First of all, it is often impractical or
impossible to bring all of the potential defendants into a DES lawsuit.
48
Second, unlike the defendants in Summers, DES manufacturers are not in a
better position than plaintiffs to identify the guilty party.49 Finally, unlike
the defendants in Summers, the activities of the defendants in DES cases oc-
curred at different times and places. 50
The second traditional theory proposed in order to ease the plaintiff's
burden of identification is the concert of action theory. Under this ap-
proach, plaintiffs must show a common design or plan among the defend-
ants, knowledge of a breach of duty and assistance in that breach, or an
independent breach of a duty to the injured party by each of the defend-
ants.51 Typically, this theory is illustrated by conceptualizing an innocent
uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such
actor to prove he has not caused the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1975). See also W. PROSSER, supra
note 31, § 41, at 243-44. Fischer, supra note 35, at 1630-35.
46. See, e.g., Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305
(1980) (defendants in a suit alleging DES-related injuries have the burden of proving
exculpation). It is interesting to note that in Ferngno, the New Jersey Superior Court
used the alternative liability theory to support an order that plaintiffs in a DES case
need not identify a specific tortfeasor, even though all defendants who could have
been responsible were not joined. 175 N.J. Super. at 565-67, 420 A.2d at 1312-13.
This differs from earlier DES cases which relied upon an alternative liability theory
but alleged that the defendants represented all potentially liable manufacturers of
DES. See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979).
There, are certain factual similarities between the Summers situation and cases
involving injury from ingestion of DES which have led courts to use the alternative
liability theory in DES cases. For example, in both situations all defendants are
tortfeasors who owe a duty of care to the plaintiff. Comment, supra note 14, at 987.
Also, in each situation, the conduct of all the defendants was identical and created
the same risk. Id. Furthermore, in neither case is the plaintiff at fault for being
unable to identify which defendant caused his or her injury. Id Finally, in both
cases, the defendants created the condition which makes identification impossible.
Id




51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1975). Section 876 defines the
concert of action theory as follows:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another,
one is subject to liability if he
a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common
design with him, or
b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself,
or
c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious re-
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person injured by some unknown participant in an illegal drag race. 52
Under the concert of action theory, the plaintiff may sue any one, or even all
of the participants in that drag race because mere participation in such anti-
social conduct is in and of itself tortious.
5 3
At least one court has allowed recovery in a DES case based on the
concert of action theory.54 It can, however, be argued that this should not
apply to DES cases because there was nothing anti-social about putting DES
on the market; it was thought to be a beneficial drug and had received gov-
ernment approval. 55 Additionally, it has been difficult to prove concerted
action-in the form of a tacit understanding-among members of such a
large and complex industry.5
6
Moving even further from traditional tort concepts towards innovative
theories which avoid the identification burden altogether, some plaintiffs
have relied on a theory of industry-wide or enterprise liability similar to that
set forth in Hall v. EI DuPont DeNemours & Co. ,57 a case brought against a
suit and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of
duty to the third person.
Id. For a discussion of this theory and its applicability to DES cases, see Comment,
supra note 14, at 978-85.
52. See, e.g., Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 183,
193, 406 A.2d 185, 190 (1979).
53. Id
54. See Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981), afd
55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982) (upholding a jury finding
that all DES manufacturers consciously paralleled each other's activities, including
the failure to adequately test the drug on the fetuses of mice). But cf. Sindell v. Ab-
bott Labs, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980) (finding no concerted action).
55. Id See McGovern, supra note 10, at 16. See also note 61 and accompanying
text infra.
56. See Note, Indust -Wide Liabiliy, supra note 20, at 427. See also McGovern,
supra note 10, at 16. For example, in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, the California
Supreme Court concluded that although the manufacturers of DES relied on each
other's testing and promotional methods these relationships were insufficient to show
the type of tacit understanding required under the concert of action theory. 26 Cal.
3d 588, 605, 607 P.2d 924, 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 140. The Sindell court also noted:
Application of the concept of concert of action to this situation would ex-
pand the doctrine far beyond its intended scope and would render virtually
any manufacturer liable for the defective products of an entire industry,
even if it could be demonstrated that the product which caused the injury
was not made by the defendant.
Id at 605, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
57. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). This case involved a claim against all six
members of the American blasting cap industry and their trade association. Id. at
358-59. In Hall, the plaintiff alleged that the injury caused by the caps was due to a
failure to place a warning on the caps, an industry-wide practice which created an
unreasonable risk of harm. Id at 359-60. The plaintiffs were unable to identify the
manufacturers of the caps which caused their injuries. Consequently, the court al-
lowed the plaintiffs to plead the existence of a concert of action among the six domes-
tic manufacturers of blasting caps and the industry's trade association. See id at 386.
For a more detailed discussion of the Hall case, see Comment, supra note 14, at 981-
85; Note, supra note 20, at 431-34.
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manufacturer of blasting caps. Industry-wide liability combines elements of
both the alternative liability and the concert of action theories. 58 In situa-
tions where the plaintiffs are unable to identify the individual defendant-
manufacturers of an injury-causing product, "the existence of industry-wide
standards or practices could support a finding of joint control of risk and a
shift of the burden of proving causation to the defendants." 59 Those favor-
ing the application of the industry-wide liability theory to DES cases argue
that public policy would be served best by shifting the risk of loss from the
injured consumer to the offending industry in situations where adherence to
an inadequate industry-wide standard has resulted in the production of a
fungible product which causes injury.6° Despite this policy argument, courts
in DES cases generally have not adopted a Hall industry-wide liability the-
ory, largely because the federal government was closely regulating the phar-
maceutical industry while DES was being used on a nationwide basis, thus
impliedly approving what plaintiffs allege was a defective standard. 6 1 Fur-
thermore, since Hall itself specifically noted that the industry-wide liability
theory might be unfair if applied to a decentralized industry with more than
five or ten producers, 62 courts have been reluctant to use this theory with
DES cases which typically involve several hundred potential defendant-
manufacturers.
6 3
A unique application of a form of industry-wide liability in a DES case
has been adopted, however, by the Supreme Court of California in Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories. 64 This theory, known as "market share liability," requires
58. Note, supra note 20, at 431-34.
59. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 374.
60. Note, supra note 20, at 428. See generally Coggins, Indusity- Wide Liability, 13
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 980 (1979).
61. See McGovern, supra note 10, at 17.
62. 345 F. Supp. at 378. The Hall court stated that "[w]hat would be fair and
feasible with regard to an industry of five or ten producers might be manifestly un-
reasonable if applied to a decentralized industry composed of thousands of small
producers." Id
For other works considering industry-wide liability, see Kroll, supra note 40;
Reed & Davison, The DES Cases and Liabi'ty Without Causation, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 511
(1982); Comment, Beyond Enterpnse Liability in DES Cses-Sindell, 14 IND. L. REV.
695 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Beyond Enterprise Liability]; Comment, In-
dust7- Wide Liability: Solving the Mystery of the Missing Manufacturer in Products Liability
Law, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 139 (1981); Note, Market Share Liability Adopted to
Overcome Defendant Identification Problems in DES Litigati'on, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 571
(1981).
63. However, although there are many manufacturers who produced DES, ap-
proximately six or seven manufacturers produced 90% of the DES that was on the
market. Note, supra note 20, at 433 (citing B. SEAMAN, WOMEN AND THE CRISIS IN
SEX HORMONES' 33 (1977)).
Another basic difference between Hall and the DES cases is that the DES manu-
facturers had no industry-wide trade association to which the power to formulate
safety standards could have been delegated. Id The DES drug industry, unlike the
blasting cap industry in Hall, was thus highly decentralized.
64. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
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the plaintiff to join enough defendants so that a substantial percentage of the
market for that product is represented.6 5 Each defendant manufacturer is
then held liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its share
of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the prod-
uct which caused the plaintiff's injuries.66 This "liability without causation"
theory could have an enormous impact in the area of toxic torts. 67 It has
been suggested that the theory would be useful in cases involving asbestos,
aluminum wiring, and Agent Orange.68 Arguably, market share liability
might inspire manufacturers to establish higher industry standards of
safety.69 However, opponents of market share liability argue that it would
discourage the development of new products and impede the progress of re-
search. 70 The impact Sindell will have on the area of toxic torts remains to
65. 26 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. In deciding
that enough defendants had been joined, the Sindell court declined to determine what
percentage of manufacturers would be sufficient to constitute a substantial percent-
age. Id at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The court observed that one
commentator had suggested that 75 to 80% of the market should be represented, but
it then concluded that "we hold only that a substantial percentage is required." Id
See also Comment, Beyond Enterprise Liability, supra note 62, at 720-21.
66. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
67. It has been suggested that Szndell's extreme dilution of the causation element
has broad implications for product manufacturers, especially in light of the fact that,
in 1952, DES was categorized as a "safe" drug by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion. Kroll, supra note 40, at 194-95. See also Comment, Beyond Enterprise Liability,
supra note 62, at 695-96, 716-17. One implication of Sindell is that manufacturers
who did not test the drug after it was classified as "safe" are liable for the conduct of
manufacturers who had the responsibility of conducting such tests prior to the 1952
"safe" rating. Kroll, supra note 40, at 195. As Justice Richardson noted in his dissent
in Sindell, by imposing this blanket liability upon all manufacturers who are joined,
"In effect, the majority requires the pharmaceutical research laboratory to install a
piece of new equipment-the psychic's crystal ball." Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 620, 607
P.2d at 942, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 150 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
68. Reed & Davison, supra note 62, at 519. Similarly, it is likely to be useful in
cases involving chemical waste, generic chemicals, and nuclear waste. Id.
69. See Coggins, supra note 60, at 1005.
70. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 619-20, 607 P.2d at 942,
163 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (Richardson, J., dissenting). As Justice Richardson noted in his
Sindell dissent, "[L]iability in the manner created by the majority must inevitably
inhibit, if not research or development, at least the dissemination of new pharmaceu-
tical drugs." Justice Richardson also expressed the fear that discouragement of re-
search and development in the drug industry would have adverse effect on society:
The social and economic benefits from mobilizing the industry's resources
in the war against disease and in reducing the costs of medical care are
potentially enormous. The development of new drugs in the last three de-
cades has already resulted in great social benefits. The potential gains from
further advances remain large. To risk such gains is unwise. Our major
objective should be to encourage a continued high level of industry invest-
ment in pharmaceutical R & D [research and development].
Id at 619, 607 P.2d at 941-42, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50 (Richardson, J., dissenting)
(quoting D. SCHWARTZMAN, THE EXPECTED RETURN FROM PHARMACEUTICAL RE-
SEARCH: SOURCES OF NEW DRUGS AND THE PROFITABILITY OF R & D INVESTMENT
54 (1975). See also Coggins, supra note 60, at 1004 ("[i]t seems likely that the vastly
increased risk of liability for product-related injuries would inevitably reduce the in-
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be seen, since other jurisdictions are just beginning to determine whether
they will follow a theory which is essentially one of liability without
causation.
7 1
centive to continue research in, for example, the area of disease prevention and
cure"); Reed & Davison, supra note 62, at 536. Reed and Davison note as follows:
"The cost to society in terms of reduced development and dissemination of drugs is
probably greater than the benefit in a case in which less than I percent of DES
children develop cancer a generation later from a drug which may have made the
injured's existence possible."
Another criticism of the Sidel court's imposition of market share liability is that
the "deep pocket" theory should not be used to pin liability upon a defendant with-
out proof of causation. Id Similarly, Justice Richardson in his Sindell dissent noted,
"[A] system priding itself on 'equal justice under the law' does not flower when ihabil-
it as well as the damage aspect of a tort action is determined by a defendant's
wealth." Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 618, 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (Richard-
son, J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original).
Opponents of the Sindell market share liability theory also note that the decision
has the effect of making the manufacturer an insurer of its products. Id at 621, 607
P.2d at 942-43, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 150-51 (Richardson, J., dissenting). Justice Rich-
ardson stated in Sindell as follows:
The majority's decision effectively makes the entire drug industry (or at
least its California members) an insurer of all injuries attributable to defec-
tive drugs of uncertain or unprovable origin, including those injuries mani-
festing themselves a generation later, and regardless of whether particular
defendants had any part whatever in causing the claimed injury.
Id For additional discussion of the opposition to Sindell's theory of market liability,
see McGovern, supra note 10, at 17-18.
Finally, there are a variety of policy considerations weighing against the adop-
tion of industry-wide liability. As one commentator has noted, industry-wide liabil-
ity is unfair to manufacturers for a variety of reasons: There is no concrete
requirement of identification of defendant; it favors plaintiffs who cannot satisfy the
identification requirement over plaintiffs who can identify the manufacturer because
the plaintiff proceeding under industry-wide liability has a larger fund from which to
recover; it extends the liability of manufacturers too far and therefore diminishes the
amount of money available for recovery; it makes manufacturers insurers of the
safety of society; it cannot serve as a deterrent because, even after a defendant has
exercised a high degree of care, unforeseen injuries may result from use of its prod-
ucts; and it would impose liability on the basis of injury alone, regardless of causa-
tion. See Coggins, supra note 60, at 1009-15. See also Note, A Remedy for the 'DES
Daughters'" Products Liability Without the Identifiation Requirement, 42 U. PITT. L. REV.
669, 669 (1981) (identifying three concerns: manufacturers will become insurers of
the safety of their products; it may not be unwise to impose such a heavy economic
burden on the drug industry; and due process problems may be presented).
71. Courts have reacted differently to Sindell. For example, a district court in
Texas, faced with the impossibility of identifying the exact manufacturer who was
liable in an asbestos case, described industry-wide liability as a "hybrid, drawing
from concepts of alternative and/or concurrent liability and the law of products lia-
bility to form a type of absolute liability." Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509
F. Supp. 1353, 1357 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (rev'don other grounds, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.
1982). The Hardy court then predicted that Texas courts would adopt some form of
Sindell liability in asbestos-related cases. Id at 1359.
In contrast, a New Jersey court cited the Sthdell opinion, but did not embrace it,
stating that adoption of the enterprise liability theory would result in total abandon-
ment of well-settled principles of products liability. Namm v. Charles E. Frosst Co.,
173 N.J. Super. 19, 35, 427 A.2d 1121, 1129 (1981). The Namm court, however, noted
that it was bound by the principles of law developed and declared by the New Jersey
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In an attempt to protect manufacturers from industry-wide liability,
legislatures at both the state and federal level have begun to consider and
enact products liability legislation. 72 For example, bills have been intro-
duced which propose that manufacturers of products can be held liable only
for injuries resulting from dangers that were scientifically discoverable at the
time the product was distributed. 73 This so-called "state of the art" defense
would be a major departure from the traditional rule that industry custom
does not conclusively establish whether the defendant took reasonable care
of whether the product was defective and could provide manufacturers with
a substantial shield.74 However, the recent decision of the New Jersey
Supreme Court. According to the Namm court, "[E]xtensive policy shifts of this mag-
nitude should not be initiated by an intermediate appellate court" like itself. In-
stead, the court stated, "The appropriate tribunal to accomplish such drastic changes
is either the Supreme Court or the Legislature." Id, 427 A.2d at 1129.
Finally, a South Carolina court expressly rejected Sindell's theory by stating as
follows:
The California court's market-share theory of liability represents a re-
jection of "over one hundred years of tort law which required that before
tort liability was imposed a 'matching' of defendants' conduct and plain-
tiff's injury was absolutely essential." The courts of both Carolinas, how-
ever, still adhere to this fundamental principle.
The unequivocal law of South Carolina is the plaintiff in a negligence
action has not only the burden of proving negligence, but also the burden of
proving that the industry or damage was caused by the actionable conduct
of the particular defendants.
Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1018 (D.S.C. 1981) (citing Sidellv. Abbott
Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 616, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
72. See generally Vandall, Undermining Torts' Pohcies: Products Liability Legislation,
30 AM. U.L. REv. 673 (1981).
73. See Johnson, Products Liability "Reform" A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C.L.
REV. 677, 680 (1978) (citing S. 2353, 45th N.D. Legis. (1977); S. 527 Pa. Legis., 1977
Sess.; S. 431 Wis. Legis., 1977-79 Biennial Sess. (1977)). For example, a bill proposed
in Pennsylvania read as follows:
In any product liability action, it shall be an absolute defense to such
action that the product conformed with generally recognized and prevail-
ing standards, designs, or methods of testing or manufacturing of the state
of the art in existence at the time the manufacturer of the final product
parted with its possession and control or sold it, whichever occurred last.
When there are two or more possible product standards, designs or methods
of testing or manufacturing in customary use, in the defendant's trade or
business or in allied or similar trades or businesses (sic) shall be treated as
being in compliance with the state of the art.
Id. at 680 (quoting S. 527 Pa. Legis., 1977 Sess.).
Insurance company lobbyists and manufacturers have actively promoted in the
state legislatures these bills which create a state of the art defense. Id at 680. Not
surprisingly, the American Insurance Association has drafted a model bill that would
allow an absolute defense to be available to the manufacturer when the design "is
supported by any substantial body of actual practice, no matter what the dominant
or preferred opinion." Id (quoting AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, PRODUCT
LIABILITY LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE: STATUTES DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE FAIR-
NESS AND ADMINISTRATION OF PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW 24 (REVISED DRAFT,
MAR. 1977)).
74. Johnson, supra note 73, at 681. According to one commentator,
[I]f state of the art defense were applied literally and absolutely, only manu-
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Supreme Court in Beshada v. Johns-Manvdlie Products Corp. 75-in which the
court held that the state of the art defense is not appropriate in a strict liabil-
ity cause of action 76-indicates that at least some courts will severely limit
the utility of the state of the art defense.
A similar legislative proposal for limiting the liability of manufacturers
provides for the creation of an absolute defense in situations where the indus-
try has complied with government regulations. 77 Small businessmen who
support this proposal argue that it is economically unrealistic to expect them
to do anything beyond what the government requires. 78 Meanwhile, critics
facturers whose product design was "less than" the industry average would
be held liable for a consumer's injuries sustained in a product-related acci-
dent.
The likely result is economically appropriate only if the average manu-
facturer will undertake all economically efficient measures to make its prod-
ucts safer and to prevent accidents, even without legal standards which
clearly make it worthwhile for the manufacturer to do so. However, this is
not likely to happen.
Id at 684 (quoting 4 THE RESEARCH GROUP, INC., FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL
STUDY 113 (Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, Jan. 1977)).
75. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
In this case the court addressed the issue of whether the medical community's pre-
sumed unawareness of the dangers of asbestos is a defense to a plaintiffs claim. Id. at
196, 447 A.2d at 542. The court noted that the state of the art defense is designed to
provide a manufacturer with a defense to a negligence claim because a manufacturer
should not be deemed culpable if it complied with existing technology. Id at 204,
447 A.2d at 546. The court observed, however, that "in strict liability cases, culpabil-
ity is irrelevant. . . . That [a product] was unsafe because of the state of technology
does not change the fact that it was unsafe. Strict liability focuses on the product,
not the fault of the manufacturer." Id at 204, 447 A.2d at 546. Since Beshada was a
strict liability case, the state-of-the-art defense was inapplicable. Id at 209, 447 A.2d
at 549.
76. Id. at 204, 447 A.2d at 546-47.
77. Johnson, supra note 73, at 687. Some states currently have statutes which
create a presumption that the product is not defective or unreasonably unsafe if it
complies with governmental standards. For example, a Tennessee statute provides as
follows:
Compliance by a manufacturer or seller with any federal or state statute or
administrative regulation existing at the time a product was manufactured
and prescribing standards for design, inspection, testing, manufacture, la-
beling, warning, or instructions for use of a product, shall raise a rebuttable
presumption that the product is not in an unreasonably dangerous condi-
tion in regard to matters covered by these standards.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (1980). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1982); N.D. CEr. CODE § 28-01.1-05(3) (Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (1977).
One criticism of this proposal is that since manufacturers have enormous power,
they frequently influence the formation of government standards. Johnson, supra
note 73, at 687. Consequently, some government standards are merely "rubber-
stamped versions of existing, voluntary standards adopted by manufacturers within
an industry." Id (citing Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, Draft Final
Report VII-30 (Oct. 14, 1977); 4 THE RESEARCH GROUP INC., FINAL REPORT OF
THE LEGAL STUDY (Interagency Task Force on Product Liability 1977)).
78. Johnson, supra note 73, at 688. However, as one writer has noted, the policy
interest in preventing injury and disease outweighs the manufacturing interests of
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of the proposal counter that this defense would adversely affect safety
incentives.
79
There have been numerous other suggested statutory reforms aimed at
coping with the problem of liability for toxic torts, such as the creation of a
Super Fund from which plaintiffs could be compensated. 80 Because of disa-
greement over who should contribute to such a fund it is unlikely that such a
fund will be created.8 ' Yet another proposed legislative solution is the estab-
lishment of a system where compensation would not be predicated on
fault.8 2 The effect that this growing body of proposed and enacted legisla-
tion will have on the development of judicial doctrines that tend to ease the
plaintiff's burden and impose an increase in potential liability on the defend-
ants still remains to be seen.
small businessmen who are engaged in producing complex products without suffi-
cient expertise. Id. at 689.
79. Id. at 687.
80. For a discussion of the Super Fund Concept, see generally Reibstein, The
Deadly Curse of Asbestos, Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 7, 1982, (Magazine), at 12, 37.
See also Comment, Superfund Proposed to Clean up Hazardous Waste Disasters, 20 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 615 (1980).
81. Reibstein, supra note 80, at 37. The asbestos industry wants the federal gov-
ernment to finance half of the fund, arguing that about half of the current plaintiffs
worked in privately owned shipyards-many during World War II-under govern-
ment contracts that required the use of asbestos. Id. The government has not, how-
ever, been responsive to this argument. Id. One writer has observed, "[In a rare
agreement with organized labor and Democrats, the Reagan administration made it
clear. . . that it would have nothing to do with such a proposal-its legal responsi-
bility extended only to federal workers, not to the great majority of workers employed
by privately owned shipyards." Id
82. Coggins, supra note 60, at 1016. The proposed no-fault systems have at least
two features in common. First, pain and suffering would merit no recovery, and
secondly, the injured party would receive at least his medical costs. Id at 1016-18.
See also O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault for Many
Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REv. 501 (1976); Sandler, Strict Liability and the Need for
Legislation, 53 VA. L. REv. 1509, 1516-18 (1967); Schwartz, Product Liabilit and No-
Fault Insurance: Can One Live Without the Other?, 12 FORUM 130 (1977).
There are many more proposals for reform. As one commentator has noted,
It has also been suggested that size of awards be limited; non-economic
awards, such as damages for pain and suffering, be limited or eliminated;
punitive damages be barred; and contingency fees more strictly regulated.
Provisions have also been advanced calling for installment payment of
damages, payment of defendants' costs of litigation by unsuccessful plain-
tiffs, and the elimination of-the ad-damnum clause from the complaint.
Other proposed legislation would restrict the remedy for workplace acci-
dents to worker's compensation, apply comparative fault principles to dam-
age awards in product cases, substitute arbitration for tort litigation, and
provide that compliance with government standards shall be a defense. Fi-
nally, virtually all proposed product liability tort reform bills include a stat-
ute of limitation or repose which would run from the date on which the
product is introduced into the stream of commerce.
Comment, When the Product Ticks.: Products Liability and Statutes of Limitation, 11 IND. L.
REV. 693, 701 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
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IV. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND STATUTES OF REPOSE
Statutes of limitations and statutes of repose8 3 create special problems
in the area of toxic torts because these statutes may bar recovery even before
the plaintiff becomes aware of his disease or injury and its cause. Generally,
83. Both statutes of limitations and statutes of repose are defined as "such legis-
lative enactments as prescribe the periods within which actions may be brought upon
certain claims ...... BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 835 (5th ed. 1979). However,
there is an important distinction between the two. As one authority in this area
explains,
Although these terms have been used in a number of different ways, a stat-
ute of limitation refers to the time between the accrual of a cause of action
and the last date available for filing a lawsuit. In states that allow a plain-
tiff to file suit at the discovery of an injury rather than when the injury
occurs, suit can potentially be filed a substantial number of years after an
injury actually happens. Some state legislatures have put an outer limit or
cap on the time available for a plaintiff to discover an injury and file suit.
This outer limit typically begins to run from the time of actual injury. In
Delaware, for example, an injured person must bring action for personal
injury against a physician within two years of the time of the injury unless
the injured party has not had an opportunity to discover the injury. In no
event, however, can the injured party bring suit more than three years from
the occurrence of actual injury. This limit of three years, called a statute of
repose, refers to a time limit for bringing a lawsuit that begins to run .. .
from some other event such as the manufacture of a product.
McGovern, supra note 10, at 6-7 (footnotes omitted). Thus, a statute of repose is an
outer limit for bringing a lawsuit that begins to run, not from the accrual of a cause
of action, but from some other event such as the manufacture of the product. Id See
generally Birnbaum, Legislative Reform or Retreat? A Response to the Product Liabihy Crisis,
14 FORUM 251 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Birnbaum, Legislative Reform]; Birnbaum,
Statutes of Limitations in Environmental Suits. The Discoveq Rule Approach, 16 TRIAL 38
(1980); Burch, Practitioner's Guide to the Statute of Limitations in Product Liabity Suits, 5
U. BALT. L. REV. 23 (1975); Houlihan, Limitations of Action: Strict Liability in Tort-the
Legislature Has Intervened, 67 ILL. B.J. 214 (1978); Kelly, The Discovelry Rule for Personal
Injury Statutes of Limitations: Reflections on the British Experience, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1641
(1978); McGovern, The Status of Statutes of Limiations in Product Liabili Suits, 5 U.
BALT. L. REV. 23 (1975); McGovern, The Status of Statutes of Limitation and Statutes of
Repose in Product Liability Actions: Present and Future, 16 FORUM 416 (1980-81) [herein-
after cited as McGovern, The Status]; McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionahty
of Product Liabiity Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 579 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
McGovern, The Variety]; Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law:
Federal Rights of Action and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1011
(1980); Comment, Limiting Liability; Products Liability anda Statute of Repose, 32 BAYLOR
L. REV. 137 (1980); Comment, The Statute of Limitations in Strict Products Liability Ac-
tions, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 477 (1975); Comment, When the Product Ticks, supra note
82; Comment, State Legislative Restrictions on Product Liability Actions, 29 MERCER L.
REV. 619 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, State Legislative Restrictions]; Com-
ment, Statutes of Repose in Products Liability: The Assault Upon the Citadel of Strict Liability,
23 S.D.L. REV. 149 (1978); Note, Accrual Dilemma: Statutes of Limitations in Hazardous
Waste Cases, 45 ALB. L. REV. 717 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Accrual Dilemma ];
Note, Product Liability-Statute of Limitations-Tort Statute of Limitations Applied in Strict
Products Liabiity Actions, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 322 (1974); Note, Workman's Compensa-
tion: Occupational Carcinogensis and Statutes of Limitation, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 712 (1979);
Note, Torts-Limitations of Actions-Accrual of Cause of Action in Products Liabilt and
Other Tort Actions, 42 TENN. L. REV. 593 (1975); Note, Statutes of Limitations: Their
Selection and Application in Products Liabihty Cases, 23 VAND. L. REV. 775 (1970).
1314 [Vol. 28: p. 1298
17
Castafero: Coping with the Particularized Problems of Toxic Tort Litigation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1983
a statute of limitations begins to run when a cause of action accrues, and is
utilized in order to prevent unfairness to defendants who would otherwise
have to defend against claims where "evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared. '84 A statute of repose, which begins
to run with the happening of an event such as the manufacture of a defective
product or the occurrence of injury, differs in that it potentially could bar a
suit before a cause of action has accrued.8 5 Therefore, while a statute of
limitation may be viewed as merely limiting a particular remedy, a statute of
repose may define a substantive right by extinguishing a cause of action.86
In the toxic tort area, it is often difficult to determine which of several
potentially applicable statutes is relevant, since the applicability of a given
statute will depend upon the theory of liability utilized, the damages sought,
84. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
348-49 (1944). Several other reasons for the existence of statutes of limitations are
often cited:
In private civil litigation, statutes of limitations act to avoid the disruption
of commercial activity which could be caused by unsettled claims. This
allows people to plan their future business and personal affairs secure in the
knowledge that they will not be subject to unexpected liability arising out
of activities engaged in at much earlier times. Related to this prejudice
against actions which are unexpected due to delay is the courts' view that
failure to assert a claim over a long period of time raises a presumption of
its invalidity. Therefore, statutes of limitations induce due diligence on the
part of plaintiffs so that potential defendants will not assume that claims
have been ignored intentionally.
Note, Accrual Dilemma, supra note 83, at 719 (footnotes omitted).
85. See McGovern, The Variety, supra note 83, at 584-85.
The terms "statute of limitation" and "statute of repose" are not used in a con-
sistent manner by the courts. Id. at 587. However, it is generally true that a statute
of repose is a statute which places an additional prescriptive period upon the time
within which actions may be brought under traditional statutes of limitations. Id
As one commentator has noted, "This may be done either by setting an outer limit on
the length of a tort statute of limitation that has 'discovery' provisions of potentially
indefinite duration, or by setting the time at which the statute begins to run at a
different time from traditional tort statutes of limitation." Id. (footnotes omitted).
86. McGovern, The Status, supra note 83, at 417. There is an on-going debate
concerning the constitutionality of the statutes of repose. As one scholar in this area
has observed,
The debate surrounding statutes of repose reaches high levels of abstrac-
tion-philosophical attitudes towards natural rights and utility, social and
moral concerns of fault and compensation, and economic theories of free
enterprise and socialism are all implicated. The constitutional issues also
raise fundamental concerns regarding the roles of the Constitution, the leg-
islatures, and the courts in our political system. Opponents of statutes of
repose ask, "Can and should a legislature abolish a cause of action before it
accrues?" Proponents ask, "Can and should a court deny the legislature its
power to define the scope of compensable harm?" At issue is the appropri-
ate balance between a state constitution and the federal Constitution, the
role of the legislature to represent the popular will, and the duty of the
court to preserve rights without encroaching upon legislative prerogatives.
McGovern, The Variety, supra note 83, at 581. See also Turner, The Counter Attack to
Retake the Citadel Continues." An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose in Prod-
ucts Liability, 46 AIR, L. & COMM. 449 (1981).
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and the subject matter under dispute.8 7 A court must first decide whether a
contract or tort statute of limitations or a statute of repose applies to a par-
ticular cause of action. Then, the court must determine the most frequently
litigated issue in this area-when a plaintiff's cause of action accrued, and
therefore when the limitations period actually began to run.
88
In determining when a cause of action "accrued" for statute of limita-
tions purposes, one might find the term "accrued" may be defined in a stat-
ute, or it may be left for judicial determination.89 Courts, however, have not
been in agreement as to when a cause of action can be said to have "ac-
crued".9° Moreover, if a cause of action is defined as "accruing" when the
plaintiff's injury occurred, there may be difficulty because often in toxic tort
87. See generally Birnbaum, Legislate Reform,supra note 83, at 270-73. For exam-
ple, the particular statute of limitations used in toxic tort cases may vary among
jurisdictions, depending upon what theory of liability is used:
Relief for injury to person or property from products may be sought under
four theories: negligence, breach of express or implied warranty sounding
in contract, breach of express or implied warranty sounding in tort, and
strict liability in tort. Except for the contractual warranty claims, these
actions are normally governed by tort statutes of limitations covering inju-
ries to person or property. However, if the plaintiff joins the contractual
warranty theory to his tort-based complaint he may, in many jurisdictions,
have the benefit of the tort limitation running from date of injury, as well as
the contract limitation running from date of injury, as well as the contract
limitation running from date of sale.
Comment, When the Product Ticks, supra note 82, at 705. Jurisdictions have disagreed
about whether allowing a plaintiff in a toxic tort action to choose among different
statutes of limitation is fair to defendants. Id (citing Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969) (extending
choice to plaintiff was unfair to defendants)). Several states are considering proposed
product liability laws which would address the unfairness to a defendant which oc-
curs when a plaintiff selects a theory of liability under which to sue, and thereby
dictates which statute of limitations will be applicable. Id at 710-11.
88. McGovern, supra note 10, at 5 (citing Prince v. Trustees of Univ. of Penn-
sylvania, 282 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp. 221 Va.
951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981)). See also Birnbaum, "First Breath's Last Gasp.- The Discovegy
Rule in Products Liability Cases", 13 FORUM 279 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Birnbaum,
"First Breath's"].
89. McGovern, supra note 10, at 5. Accrual of a cause of action has been vari-
ously defined to include the following: when the defendant breaches his duty to the
plaintiff; when a plaintiff is first injured; when he is last injured; when the first symp-
toms occur; when the plaintiff first becomes aware of the full extent of his injury or
disease; when the plaintiff is aware of the cause of the injury; when the plaintiff
reasonably should have discovered the injury or disease; or when the plaintiff is
aware of facts that give rise to a claim. Id See also McGovern, The Status, supra note
83, at 421.
90. See McGovern, The Status, supra note 83, at 421. Courts do not agree on
accrual dates. Id Some modern courts still adhere to the traditional (common-law)
view that "the cause of action accrues at the time of invasion of [plaintiff's] body."
See, e.g., Steinhardt v. Johns-Mansville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 1010, 430 N.E.2d
1297, 1299, 466 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (1981). Other modern courts employ "discovery
rules" which begin the limitations period at time of a plaintiff's discovery of his in-
jury by "some" or "substantial" evidence. For a discussion of these "discovery" rules,
see notes 93-95 and accompanying text infra. See also Neubauer v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglass Corp., 686 F.2d 570 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1233 (1983)
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cases a substantial period of time will have elapsed between a plaintiff's ex-
posure to a product and the manifestation of his injury.9 1
Because of the inequities that strict adherence to the traditional statutes
of limitation or repose may create in the area of toxic torts, 92 several courts
have formulated special "discovery rules" to delay the commencement of the
period of limitations. 93 Uncertainty is compounded, however, as courts
adopting such rules do not agree on whether the date of "discovery" refers to
the date the disease is discovered or to the date the plaintiff becomes aware of
the causal relationship between his disease and the defendant's conduct. 94 The
(cause of action accrues when asbestos-related disease becomes diagnosable regardless
of whether plaintiff has suffered any noticeable impairment).
91. See generally Henderson, Coping With the Tine Dimension in Products Liability, 69
CAL. L. REV. 919 (1981). There are other problems associated with the time lapse
between issuance of the defective product into commerce and litigation. As one
writer has pointed out,
Between the time a product is distributed in commerce and the time its
defectiveness is determined in court, previously unknown hazards, or tech-
niques for reducing known hazards, may be discovered. Moreover, design
and marketing decisions that were consistent with prevailing attitudes to-
ward product-related risks at the time of distribution may be inconsistent
with prevailing attitudes when the claim for recovery is litigated.
Id at 919.
92. Birnbaum, "First Breath's," supra note 88, at 285. As Birnbaum has
observed,
There is a growing awareness that of the thousands of commercially pro-
duced chemical compounds to which we are all, in one way or another,
exposed, many are causally linked with cancer and other fatal diseases that
develop over a sustained period of time with serious or fatal effects. For
example, it has been reported that sixty to ninety-percent of all cancer cases
can be attributed to environmental factors, and thus are potentially avoida-
ble. It is becoming apparent that many of these products may cause ill-
effects that will not manifest themselves perhaps for decades. To adhere to
an obsolete "time of contact" accrual rule for statute of limitation purposes
is to encourage commercial irresponsibility on the part of manufacturers.
Id.
93. Id at 285-90. See McGovern, The Status, supra note 83, at 421. "Discovery
rules" begin the limitations period at the time of "discovery" of the injury by the
plaintiff, either by actual or objective knowledge, which must be proved by "some"
or "substantial" evidence. Id See also Birnbaum, "First Breath's," supra note 88, at
285. The reason for the formulation of these so-called "discovery rules" is that courts
have believed that the injured party should be allowed to have his day in court when
his injury was of an inherently unascertainable nature. Id
94. See Birnbaum, "First Breath's ," supra note 88, at 287. Many courts state that
under the discovery rule, the plaintiff's cause of action accrues when he discovers or,
in exercise of reasonable diligence, he should have discovered his injury. Id. Other
courts hold that the statute of limitations accrues when the plaintiff is first advised
that his injury probably resulted from exposure to the defendant's product. See, e.g.,
Roman v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 518 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1975). Under this second
approach, mere manifestation or awareness of the impairment itself is insufficient to
cause the statute of limitations to run, unless there is also an awareness of a causal
link between the disease and the product. Birnbaum, "First Breath's," supra note 88,
at 287. See, e.g., Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 170-71, 371 A.2d 170, 174
(1977). In 1981, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania statute
of limitations did not begin to run until the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should
1982-83] 1317
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discovery rules also differ in their standards of proof for determining when a
statute of limitations begins to run. For example, courts which accept the
discovery of an injury as beginning the limitations periods, disagree as to
whether this discovery may be shown by "some" or "substantial" evidence,
or by objective or actual knowledge.9 5 Other courts have rejected the judi-
cial development of these discovery rules altogether, often declaring that
such an extension of the limitations period must be implemented legisla-
tively and not by the courts.
96
In an attempt to circumvent the time limits imposed by the statutes of
limitations, plaintiffs have often successfully asserted "secondary exposure"
theories, such as continuing exposure to toxic torts-which prevents deter-
mining when the toxic tort injury occurred 9 7-or a continuing duty to
warn.
98
In reaction to serious problems involving product liability actions and
statutes of limitations, fifteen states have passed special statutes of limitation
which apply solely to product liability actions. 99 Some authorities also feel
have discovered (1) his injury; (2) its operative cause; and (3) the causative relation-
ship between the injury and the operative conduct. Anthony v. Koppers Co., 496 Pa.
119, 436 A.2d 181, 181 (1981). The court held that the plaintiff did not need to have
knowledge that he or she had a cause of action for the statute of limitations to begin to
run. Id
95. McGovern, The Status, supra note 83, at 421.
96. See, e.g., Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 430
N.E.2d 1297, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1981) (extension of New York's discovery provision
"is a matter best reserved for the Legislature, and not for the courts"). See also Neu-
bauer v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 686 F.2d 570, 574 n.2 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1233 (1983).
97. McGovern, supra note 10, at 6. See also Johnson v. Tipton, 103 Ill. App. 3d
291, 431 N.E.2d 464 (1982) (where seepage of stored manufacturing chemical waste
continued to cause injuries to residents of a nearby farm property over several years,
the limitations period did not begin until the date of the last injury, or when the
tortious acts ceased).
98. McGovern, supra note 10, at 6. One commentator has noted that "[s]ome
courts have held that once a manufacturer supplies a defective product, he is under a
continuing duty either to correct the defective condition or to warn the purchaser of
that condition. The evidence of this continuing duty may toll the statute of limita-
tions." Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liabi'ty Statutes of Limitation,
56 N.C.L. REv. 663, 666 (1978). Promises to repair, and/or continued servicing or
repair of the defective product have also been held by some jurisdictions to delay the
running of the statute of limitations. Id at 667. See also Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte
Corp. of Santa Barbara, 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1099-1100 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (where a
doctor inserted prosthetic devices in a patient's breasts in 1971, and continued to
treat patient for complications of the insert until 1973, the statute of limitations could
be extended under the doctrine of "continuous treatment," and the manufacturer of
the prosthesis could be sued under negligence and strict products liability theories).
99. McGovern, The Status, supra note 83, at 423-24. These statutes differ as to
the length of the limitations periods, the parties covered by the statutes, the legal
theories to which they are applicable, the amount of discovery allowed, and the time
from when the statutes begin to run. For a listing of the various state product liabil-
ity statutes of limitation and the length of their statutory periods, see id. at 438-43,
appendix a. The Model Uniform Product Liability Act has a two year statute of
limitations which runs from the time "the claimant discovered, or in the exercise of
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21
Castafero: Coping with the Particularized Problems of Toxic Tort Litigation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1983
COMMENT
that enacting a statute of repose which would establish a maximum period of
time after the sale of a toxic product, during which a manufacturer could be
held liable for harm, would alleviate a number of problems, especially in the
area of insurance.100 In response to the "time lapse" problem in the product
liability area, twenty states have, in fact, passed special statutes of repose, no
two of which are identical.10 ' However, the existing variation among both
state statutes of repose and of limitation can only serve to promote wide-
spread forum-shopping by toxic tort plaintiffs. Consequently, this area of
the law may be ripe for federal legislation to ensure that all parties receive
equal treatment regardless of their domicile.102
V. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of identical
issues in different lawsuits.' 0 3 Issues which were actually litigated in the first
due diligence should have discovered, the harm and the cause thereof." MODEL UNI-
FORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 110(c), 40 Fed. Reg. at 62,732 (1979).
100. Phillips, supra note 98, at 663-64. Manufacturers have supported a reform
of the products liability statutes of limitations and repose due to the soaring cost of
products liability insurance. Id. The manufacturers favor one limitations period for
all products liability actions, despite the theory of liability used. Id at 663. They
also favor a definite cut-off of liability by a statute of repose which would run from
the date of the sale of the product. Id. at 664. As one scholar has observed, "[T]o
allow claims for product injuries occurring long after the date of manufacture un-
fairly handicaps the manufacturer in insuring against products hazards." Id at 674.
A manufacturer will reflect insurance premium costs in the price of its products. Id.
Consequently, it is the consumer who will ultimately bear the cost of increased pre-
miums. Id at 675.
101. These state statutes of repose vary with respect to the time the repose pe-
riod begins to run, the length of the repose period, and the effect that the expiration
of the repose period has on a cause of action. Id. at 425. For a fuller discussion of
products liability statutes of repose, see McGovern, The Status, supra note 83, at 425-
26. The Model Uniform Product Liability Act suggests two different repose statute
approaches: 1) a "useful safe life" provision which focuses on the age of a product by
creating an affirmative defense if a product has caused harm after its "useful safe
life", as measured by such factors as wear and tear, deterioration, and alternatives to
the product, has expired; and 2) a statute of repose provision which supposes that the
useful safe life of a product will be presumed to have expired in cases where the harm
was caused more than ten years after the time of delivery of the product. MODEl.
UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, § 110(c) et seq., 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,732 et seq.
(1979).
For a discussion of the difference between statutes of limitations and statutes of
repose, see notes 83-85 and accompanying text supra. For additional discussion re-
garding the time lapse problem which often characterizes toxic tort litigation, see
note 91 and accompanying text supra.
102. For a discussion of the desirability of federal legislation in the area of toxic
torts, see notes 161-79 infra.
103. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 442 (1970). The Supreme Court in Ashe
noted that "[w]hen an issue of ultimate fact has been determined by a valid judg-
ment, that issue cannot be litigated again between the same parties in future litiga-
tion." Id. For a discussion of collateral estoppel, see generally Deahl, O/fensive
Collateral Estoppel Under the Full and Fair Opportunity Test, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV.
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action and which were essential to a valid, final judgment are subject to the
collateral estoppel bar.'0 4 Two important policy arguments support this
doctrine. First, the doctrine protects individual litigants from the harass-
ment of burdensome relitigation, and second, the doctrine promotes judicial
economy. 105
Collateral estoppel has traditionally been limited by the requirement of
mutuality of estoppel. 10 6 The mutuality requirement is only satisfied if the
party attempting to invoke the conclusive effect of a prior judgment would
have been bound by that judgment if it had gone the other way.'0 7 Conse-
quently, if the second action involves different parties, the requirement of
mutuality is not met, and collateral estoppel could not be applied because
the first judgment would not be mutually binding on the parties in the sec-
ond action.' 0 8 However, mutuality is no longer a prerequisite for the appli-
cation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in all jurisdictions.' 0 9 The
requirement of mutuality was first rejected by California in Bernhard v. Bank
of America National Trust & Savings Association. 1 1  Following Bernhard, the
247, 248 (1980); Stewart, ResJudicata and Collateral Estoppel in South Caroha, 28 S.C.L.
REV. 451 (1977); Weinberger, Collateral Estoppel and the Mass Produced Product." A Propo-
sal, 15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1 (1979-80); Note, Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co.: The
Seventh Amendment and Collateral Estoppel, 66 CAL. L. REV. 861 (1978); Note, Damage
Actions Under Section 19893for Illegal Searches and Seizures." Reconsidering the Applicabihty of
Collateral Estoppel, 1980 DUKE L.J. 1401; Note, The Collateral Estoppel Efect of Adminis-
trative Agency Actions in Federal Civil Litigation, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 65 (1977); Note,
Nonmutuaity: Taking the Fairness Out of Collateral Estoppel, 13 IND. L. REV. 563 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Nonmutuality]; Note, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel in Multi-
state Litigation." An Evaluation of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, 35 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 993 (1978).
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 comment a (Tent. Draft.
No. 3, 1976).
105. See Note, Nonmutuahty, supra note 103, at 570-71. The author of the note
has observed that in view of today's crowded dockets, the doctrine seems fair "to the
overworked judiciary and to 'other litigants who might have to wait to have their day
in court because our litigant is allowed to litigate the same issue over and over
again.'" Id. (quoting Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298, 304 (D.
Md. 1967)).
106. Deahl, supra note 103, at 249. The mutuality doctrine requires one to have
been either a party or in privity with a party to the suit in which judgment was
rendered in order to invoke the conclusive effect of that judgment. Id. at 249-50
(citing IB J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.412(1), at 1801 (2d ed.
1974).
107. Id at 250.
108. Note, Nunmutuality, supra note 103, at 565 (citing State v. Speidel, 392
N.E.2d 1172, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979)).
109. See notes 110-13 and accompanying text supra. However, some courts are
unwilling to allow collateral estoppel to be used "offensively." See, e.g., Hicks v.
Quaker Oats Co., 662 F.2d 1158, 1166 (5th Cir. 1981) (Mississippi state law does not
permit the offensive use of collateral estoppel).
110. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). Bernhard involved a situation where it
had been determined in a probate action brought by the beneficiaries of a testator's
will against the executor of the estate that the testator intended a gift by transfer of
certain funds. Id The estate administrator was subsequently estopped from suing a
bank, which had not been a party in the prior action, for the same funds, since the
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United States Supreme Court,' the Restatement of Judgments,1 12 and at
least a minority of state courts 1 3 have permitted the use of collateral estop-
pel in the absence of mutuality.
In determining whether an application of the doctrine of collateral es-
toppel should be permitted, several modern courts which have abandoned
issue as to the disposition of the money was identical with the issue raised in the
earlier probate action. Id at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
Bernhard is an example of the defensive application of collateral estoppel. F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE, 581 (2d ed. 1965).
111. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402
U.S. 313 (1971). The Blonder- Tongue Court held that collateral estoppel could be used
defensively by a defendant in a patent infringement action where the prior judgment
had declared the same patent invalid. Id. at 347. Like Bernhard, Blonder-Tongue was a
case involving the application of defensive collateral estoppel. F. JAMES & G. HAZ-
ARD, supra note 110, at 581. Eight years later, the Supreme Court approved the use
of offensive collateral estoppel by a plaintiff in "appropriate circumstances." Park-
lane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1974). For a discussion of Parklane, see
notes 117-19 and accompanying text infra.
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982). The Restatement
states in relevant part:
A party precluded from relitigating an issue with an opposing party, in
accordance with §§ 27 and 28, is also precluded from doing so with another
person unless the fact that he lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issue in the first action or other circumstances justify affording him an op-
portunity to relitigate the issue. The circumstances to which considerations
should be given include those enumerated in § 28 and also whether:
(1) Treating the issue as conclusively determined would be incompatible
with an applicable scheme of administering the remedies in the actions
involved;
(2) The forum in the second action affords the party against whom preclu-
sion is asserted procedural opportunities in the presentation and determina-
tion of the issue that were not available in the first action and could likely
result in the issue being differently determined;
(3) The person seeking to invoke favorable preclusion, or to avoid unfa-
vorable preclusion, could have effected joinder in the first action between
himself and his present adversary;
(4) The determination relied on as preclusive was itself inconsistent with
another determination of the same issue;
(5) The prior determination may have been affected by relationships
among the parties to the first action that are not present in the subsequent
action, or apparently was based on a compromise verdict or finding;
(6) Treating the issue as conclusively determined may complicate deter-
mination of issues in the subsequent action or prejudice the interests of an-
other party thereto;
(7) The issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively determined
would inappropriately foreclose opportunity for obtaining reconsideration
of the legal rule upon which it was based;
(8) Other compelling circumstances make it appropriate that the party be
permitted to relitigate the issue.
Id
113. See, e.g., Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 616 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1980)
(applying Pennsylvania law); Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d at 811-13, 122
P.2d at 894-95; Continental Can Co. v. Hudson Foam Latex Prods., Inc., 129 N.J.
Super. 426, 324 A.2d 60 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974); In re Ellis Estate, 460 Pa.
281, 333 A.2d 728 (1978).
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the requirement of mutuality have distinguished between suits involving "of-
fensive" collateral estoppel from those involving "defensive" collateral estop-
pel. Offensive use of collateral estoppel arises when a plaintiff attempts to
preclude the defendant from relitigating issues which were previously liti-
gated adversely to the defendant in a suit against a different plaintiff."
1 4
Defensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a defendant attempts to pre-
clude the plaintiff from reasserting claims that were previously litigated ad-
versely to the plaintiff in an action against a different defendant. 1 5 Courts
are more cautious in allowing offensive collateral estoppel, because of a
heightened risk of unfairness. " 16 Yet, the Supreme Court in Parklane Hosieql
114. See George, Sweet Uses of Adversity. Parklane Hosiery and the Collateral Class
Action, 32 STAN. L. REV. 655 (1980).
115. Id at 655-56. See also Deahl, supra note 103, at 251.
116. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1979). The
Parklane Hosiey Court noted that there are several basic reasons why offensive use of
collateral estoppel should be permitted less frequently than defensive use of collateral
estoppel. Id. at 329. First, the Court reasoned that the offensive use of collateral
estoppel does not promote judicial economy. Id. The Court stated as follows:
Defensive use of collateral estoppel precludes a plaintiff from relitigating
identical issues by merely "switching adversaries." . . . Thus defensive col-
lateral estoppel gives a plaintiff a strong incentive to join all potential de-
fendants in the first action if possible. Offensive use of collateral estoppel,
on the other hand, creates precisely the opposite incentive. Since a plaintiff
will be able to rely on a previous judgment against a defendant but will not
be bound by that judgment if the defendant wins, the plaintiff has every
incentive to adopt a "wait and see" attitude, in the hope that the first action
by another plaintiff will result in a favorable judgment.
Id. at 329-30. The Parklane Hosiery Court also noted that the offensive use of collateral
estoppel may be unfair to a defendant. Id. at 330. For example, the Court opined
that if the first action involves only nominal damages the defendant may not defend
vigorously, especially if he does not foresee other suits. Id See also Hicks v. Quaker
Oats Co., 662 F.2d 1158, 1170-71 (5th Cir. 1981) (use of collateral estoppel denied
because its use would be unfair to the defendant who had had little incentive to
defend in the eariler suit which had only involved a small amount). The Parklane
Hosi'eg Court said that allowing the use of offensive collateral estoppel may be unfair
that to a defendant if the judgment relied upon as the basis for the estoppel is incon-
sistent with one or more previous judgments which were in favor of the defendant.
Id. Finally, the Court maintained that the offensive use of collateral estoppel might
be unfair where the second action affords the defendant a procedural advantage that
had been unavailable in the first action. Id. at 330-31. For a discussion of the policy
rationale against the use of offensive collateral estoppel, see Deahl, supra note 103, at
254-57.
Some additional reasons given for opposing offensive non-mutual use of collat-
eral estoppel are
(1) that the ascertainment of truth is an important goal of the litigation
process and unilateral collateral estoppel may bind parties to prior adjudi-
cations which did not establish the truth; (2) that the result of any given
litigation is likely to be influenced by such extra-legal factors as the attrac-
tiveness of the parties, the ability of counsel, or the personal prejudices of
the jurors, rendering such result a poor basis for future decisions; (3) that
the party who was defeated in the prior action may have lost only because
of tactical disadvantages of the forum, which the defeated party did not
choose; (4) that allowing unilateral assertions of collateral estoppel, espe-
cially offensively, may undermine judicial economy, an important goal of
1322 [Vol. 28: p. 1298
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Co. v. Shore H 7 refused to limit the federal doctrine of collateral estoppel to
defensive use only." 8 Instead of totally banning the use of offensive collat-
eral estoppel, the Parklane Court granted a trial court broad discretion to
determine when it should be used, and cautioned against potentially unfair
applications. "19
Plaintiffs' attorneys have championed the application of offensive col-
lateral estoppel in toxic tort cases because a defendant who loses a case
where the issue of the defectiveness or unsafe nature of a particular toxic
substance is a necessary predicate to the outcome of the case, is then pre-
cluded from denying the defectiveness of that product in subsequent litiga-
tion brought by different plaintiffs.' 20 This application of offensive
collateral estoppel in toxic tort cases could have a great impact on the man-
ner in which such cases are tried.' 2 ' Conceivably, the only issue upon which
collateral estoppel, by permitting persons who might have joined an earlier
action to wait and bring separate actions, asserting an estoppel based on the
first; (5) that it is unfair for one who has not risked anything in the prior
action to use a favorable result against one who was a party to that action;
and finally (6) that unilateral collateral estoppel, if applied mechanically,
would require estopping a party who had lost in a prior action, even though
other actions in which that party was involved were inconsistent with that
adverse result.
Callen & Kadue, To Bury Mutuality, Not to Praise It." An Analysts of Collateral Estoppel
After Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 755, 757-58 (1980) (footnotes
omitted).
117. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
118. Id at 331-33. The Parklane case involved a stockholder's class action suit
against Parklane Hosiery Company and thirteen of its officers, directors, and stock-
holders. Id. at 324. The complaint alleged that the defendants had issued materially
false and misleading proxy statements in connection with a merger. Id However,
before the class action came to trial, a decision was rendered in a federal district court
against the same defendants in a suit instituted by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. Id at 325. That decision resulted in a declaratory judgment which held
that the proxy statement was materially false and misleading in the respects alleged.
Id. The Supreme Court, in the ultimate appeal, approved the offensive use of collat-
eral estoppel as long as the use of the doctrine was fair and the plaintiff asserting the
doctrine could not have easily joined the earlier action. Id at 331.
119. Id See also Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co., 662 F.2d 1158, 1170-71 (5th Cir.
1981) (use of collateral estoppel denied because its use would be unfair to the defend-
ant who had had little incentive to defend in the earlier suit which had only involved
a small amount).
120. McGovern, supra note 10, at 8-9. For example, in states which have abol-
ished the doctrine of mutuality of collateral estoppel, DES victims could assert as
collateral estoppel adverse judgments rendered against the major manufacturers of
DES. Of course, a judgment against one manufacturer of DES would not operate as
collateral estoppel against another manufacturer, because the full and fair opportu-
nity test requires the prior judgment to have been against the individual manufac-
turer against whom estoppel is currently being sought. See Kroll, Prnciples of Collateral
Estoppel in Products Liabih'ty, 1979 INs. L.J. 313, 322-23. See also Hardy v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982) (collateral estoppel could not be
applied against DES manufacturers who were not defendants in the prior action).
121. Weinberger, supra note 103, at 2. As one commentator has pointed out,
Reduced to its simplest elements, the application of the doctrine to this area
of the law might preclude innumerable plaintiffs who have suffered per-
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a manufacturer could be estopped would be that of the defectiveness or un-
safe nature of the product, while all other elements of the cause of action
would still be subject to proof.' 22 When considering a strict liability ac-
tion, 123 it is clear that the use of collateral estoppel would be of great value,
because a plaintiff would not have to prove that the product was defective;
he would only have to prove that the defect was a "substantial factor'. in
producing the injury sustained. 12 4
sonal injury while using a common product from prosecuting a products
liability cause of action because one such plaintiff, perhaps half a continent
away, previously brought a similar suit involving that product-and lost.
Conversely, the doctrine might preclude a defendant from denying that its
product was defective in countless personal injury lawsuits, each involving
different plaintiffs and various fact patterns, because one plaintiff previ-
ously brought an action involving the same product-and won. Such a
scenario, affecting the rights of numerous parties who have, in effect, partic-
ipated in tort litigation in absentia, [sic] would revolutionize the products
liability field.
Id
122. Kroll, supra note 120, at 319. See also Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
488 F. Supp. 836, 840 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp., 485 F. Supp.242 (E.D. Tex, 1980). For example, in both Flat and Mooney the plaintiffs had to
establish that there had been enough exposure to asbestos to cause a disease, even
though manufacturers were estopped from relitigating whether products containing
asbestos were defective, and whether the asbestos dust could cause mesothelioma and
asbestosis.
123. Many toxic tort suits are brought under a strict liability theory. According
to § 402A of the Restatement of Torts, strict liability is applicable to products that
are in a "defective condition" which causes physical harm to the user of the product.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1975). The commentary accompa-
nying § 402A indicates that the term "defective condition" encompasses not only
products that are unreasonably dangerous to the user of the product, but also prod-
ucts like drugs, which are incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordi-
nary use-the so-called "unavoidably unsafe products." Id. comments g & k. An
unavoidably unsafe product is in a defective condition if the manufacturer has failed
to provide proper warnings to users of the product which indicate that the product
has recognizable risks. Id comment k.
DES cases are often brought under a strict liability theory because DES manu-
facturers failed to warn users of the drug's potential dangers and marketed DES on
an unlimited basis, rather than on an experimental basis accompanied with a warn-
ing label as authorized by the Food and Drug Administration. See, e.g., Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 912 (1980). In suits alleging injury from inhalation of asbestos, plaintiffs
also often allege, inter aha, that the defendants failed to warn of the risks inherent in
asbestos products thus making the product "unreasonably dangerous" and therefore
"defective." See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1086
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
It should also be noted, however, that toxic tort suits are also brought under
negligence or breach of express or implied warranty theories. See, e.g., id. at 1086;
Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1982).
124. Kroll, supra note 120, at 319-20 (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 656 (4th ed. 1971)). In strict liability suits plaintiffs only have to
prove that the defect was a "substantial factor" in producing their injury, whereas in
negligence suits, the defect must be the "proximate cause" of a plaintiff's injury. d.
Thus, where collateral estoppel is used to establish that a product is defective and
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Advocates of a liberal application of collateral estoppel contend that its
use would promote judicial economy, encourage safer product design and
quality control practices, and help equalize the marked difference in
financial resources between a consumer plaintiff and a major manufacturing
defendant.1 25 Undoubtedly the expanded use of collateral estoppel would
also encourage manufacturers to provide prompt, adequate warnings when
research indicates that a product is hazardous. 126
Meanwhile, opponents of the use of collateral estoppel in product liabil-
ity cases argue that its use would deal a crushing blow to the defendant
manufacturers.1 2 7 They also contend that the common law judicial system
should promote individualized justice, and claim that judicial economy will
not result from the expanded use of collateral estoppel because parties would
simply expend more effort litigating otherwise trivial cases or arguing the
appropriateness of applying collateral estoppel in a given case. 128 Thus far,
courts have expressed differing opinions regarding the expanded use of col-
lateral estoppel in toxic tort cases. 129
unreasonably dangerous, a plaintiff will have an easier time proving causation under
a strict liability theory than under a negligence theory. Id. at 320.
125. See McGovern, supra note 10, at 9; Weinberger, supra note 103, at 20-2 1.
126. One of the major issues in asbestos litigation concerns when the manufac-
turers of products containing asbestos had the duty to warn their employees of the
hazards of asbestos dust. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F.
Supp. 539, 542 n.2 (D. Minn. 1982). In Bertrand, the court noted that if reliable
medical data that indicated that breathing asbestos dust increased the likelihood of
contracting asbestosis had been available forty years ago, then manufacturers had the
duty to warn about this hazard at that time. Id Plaintiffs in suits involving asbestos-
related disease have contended that the duty to warn arose long before defendants
began to give such warnings. See id If manufacturers knew that offensive collateral
estoppel would frequently be applicable in products liability suits, they might more
diligently keep abreast of medical research and be more likely to issue immediate
warnings when reliable evidence indicated that a product had potentially serious
health hazards.
127. Note, Nonmutuality, supra note 103, at 595. As one writer has observed,
Products liability litigation serves as an example of the crushing bur-
den a losing defendant bears. A manufacturer is sued by a plaintiff for
injuries resulting from a faulty product. Countless buyers have purchased
the same product. If the manufacturer is held liable, all buyers similarly
injured may avail themselves of the judgment on the defect issue because
estoppel is fair in light of the factors which courts consider to determine
fairness. Given the large number of customers, similar future suits are fore-
seeable because they may "typically follow," the charge of products liability
is serious enough to expect vigorous defense, and joinder of plaintiffs is im-
possible because claims arise separately at the time of each injury. Thus,
the defendant can be estopped ad infinitum by future users injured by the
product.
Id at 595-96.
128. McGovern, supra note 10, at 10 (citing Note, lnvoklng Collateral Estoppel Of-
fensively: The Ends ofjustice or the End ofJusttce, 4 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY 75, 88
(1980)).
129. Compare Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1981)
with Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1982).
In Hardy, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court which had construed a
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Prior to the late 1960's, insurance companies had been confronted with
few "pollution" claims-that is, claims resulting from the seepage of toxic
substances into water, air, earth or the human body. 130 Coverage for such
claims, therefore, was generally afforded under general liability policies.
Some of those policies, however, included a more particularized "occurrence
coverage" which provided that the insurer would pay claims resulting from
bodily injury caused by an "occurrence" within the period covered by the
policy. 13 ' A typical policy affording this "occurrence coverage" would de-
fine the term "occurrence" as an accident, which would encompass continu-
ous or repeated exposure to conditions that result in bodily injury or
property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
insured during the policy period. 132 The threshold issue in claims based
upon such policies thus became pinpointing the time of the "occurrence." 1
33
As lawsuits for "non-sudden" injuries began to increase, the difficulties
of product liability coverage became apparent. For example, it was often
unclear when the "occurrence" had taken place. 134 Consequently, subse-
quent insurers would assert claims against earlier insurers, contending that
the latent disease or injury should be covered under policies issued in prior
years.' 35 Compounding the problem of identifying which insurer was liable,
previous Fifth Circuit case-Borel v. Fbreboard Paper Prods. Corp. -as establishing, inter
alia, that asbestos is in all cases a cause of asbestosis and mesothelioma, and, as such,
is generally hazardous. Hardy, 681 F.2d at 347 (citing Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974)). Based
upon this interpretation of Borel, the trial court had issued an order estopping the
parties from presenting evidence as to whether asbestos causes asbestosis and
mesothelioma. Id at 336. The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court's order, stating
that the application of collateral estoppel was inappropriate because Borel did not
establish as a matter of fact that asbestos in all products is a cause of cancer. Id. at
348.
In Bertrand, however, the Minnesota district court concluded that it was appro-
priate to use collateral estoppel to preclude litigation on the issue of whether asbestos
dust is a cause of asbestosis and mesothelioma. d at 544.
130. Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damages Claims, 15 FORUM
551, 551-52 (1979-80).
131. Id at 553; E. Shea, Product Liability: A Continuing Process of Change, 68 A.B.A.
J. 576, 577 (1982). This "occurrence coverage" would normally be accomplished by
a small increase in premiums. Hourihan, supra note 130, at 553.
132. Shea, supra note 131, at 577. Hence, insurers for chemical companies that
dump toxic waste could contend that there is no liability because the property dam-
age caused by the toxic waste was both expected and intended. McGovern, supra
note 10, n.372.
133. See Shea, supra note 131, at 578.
134. Id
135. Id Although a product may be alleged to have been "defective" since
manufacture, an "occurrence" which triggers insurance coverage does not happen
until the "defect" results in bodily injury or property damage. Id This method of
coverage means that when an insurer issues or renews a policy for a particular year, it
assumes the risk of sudden occurrences involving products that were sold in prior
years when the manufacturer may have been self-insured or covered by another in-
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COMMENT
was the fact that the claimed liability for latent diseases or injuries far ex-
ceeded the customary limits afforded for "occurrences" within the annual
policy coverage.1 36 As a result, one of the biggest problem areas in the field
of toxic tort insurance has become allocating the responsibility for insurance
coverage among the various insurers, who, over the course of a number of
years, have insured the defendant manufacturers.1
3 7
In response to this problem of allocation among insurers, two different
insurance theories have emerged. The first is the "manifestation" theory,
which was adopted in American Motorists Insurance Co. v. ER. Squibb & Sons,
Inc. 138 In American Motorits, the New York Supreme Court decided that the
insurer whose policies were in effect during the years when the injuries from
the toxic substance manifested themselves is liable for such injuries.1 39 In
contrast is the "exposure" theory, which was adopted in Insurance Company of
North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. 140 This theory states that the in-
surer providing coverage during the years a worker was exposed to the toxic
surer. Id. Consequently, insurers providing coverage during a period in which an
"occurrence" takes place, have asserted claims against earlier insurers and the manu-
facturer in an attempt to shift to them at least a proportionate share of the liability
for latent diseases and injuries. Id. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mu-
tual Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982) (manufacturer of asbestos products brought
suit seeking a declaratory judgment as to the rights and liabilities of its various
insurers).
136. As the 1970's progressed, the liability claimed in suits alleging latent dis-
eases or injuries not only exceeded the limits generally afforded for "occurrences"
within a policy period, but also exceeded the amount of "excess" coverage from sec-
ondary insurers that manufacturers had retained during the policy period. Shea,
supra note 131, at 578. "Excess" coverage goes into effect only if the policy limits of
the primary insurer are exhausted. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co., 682 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1982).
137. See generally Appel, Liability in Mass Immunization Programs, 1980 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 69; Hourihan, supra note 130.
138. 95 Misc. 2d 222, 406 N.Y.S.2d 658 (Sup. Ct. 1978). American Motorists was a
DES case in which the New York Supreme Court, in a declaratory judgment action,
was asked to construe an insurance policy to determine whether the defendant's con-
duct came within its coverage. Id at 223, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
139. Id. at 223-24, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 659-60. The American Motorists court con-
cluded that it was the resulting injuries which triggered the policy, and not the acci-
dent or exposure. Id. at 223, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 659. The court noted, "It would be a
strained interpretation to construe the occurrence clause as though it covered 'expo-
sure during the policy period which results in bodily injury.' It is the result which is
keyed to the policy period, and not the accident or exposure." Id. at 223-24, 406
N.Y.S.2d at 659-60.
140. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980). Forty-Eight involved the question of which
insurance carrier had a duty to defend and/or indemnify a defendant. Id at 1213-
14. The Sixth Circuit chose to delegate liability among insurers of the manufacturer
via the exposure theory for several reasons. Id at 1225. First, the court found that
the conduct and correspondence of the insurers indicated that the meaning of their
contract was supportive of the exposure theory. Id at 1222. Second, the court found
that medical evidence established that each deposit of scar-like tissue caused by the
inhalation of an asbestos fiber was the occurrence of a disease or was bodily injury,
and then reasoned that it is the occurrence and not the manifestation of the injury
which creates the underlying tort liability. Id. at 1219, 1222-23, 1226 & n.28.
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substance is liable for subsequent injuries which result from exposure. 14 1
While recent decisions do not indicate a trend favoring one theory over
the other, they do illustrate the judiciary's tendency to choose the theory
that provides the greatest insurance coverage on the facts of a particular
case. 142 For example, in Eagle-Picher Industries v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co. ,143 the First Circuit adopted the manifestation theory, noting that in this
case that such a theory maximized coverage.14 4 The District of Columbia
Circuit, in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Company of North America,'45 also sought to
maximize insurance coverage in the case before it by adopting the position
that both exposure and manifestation trigger coverage.' 46 At present, it is
141. Id at 1225, 1226 nn.27-28. See also Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641
F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981) (adopting exposure theory and endorsing the opinion of the
Sixth Circuit in Forty-Eight).
142. Shea, supra note 131, at 578.
143. 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982). Eagle-Picher involved a declaratory judgment
action in which Eagle-Picher Industries, a manufacturer of asbestos products, re-
quested a declaration of the rights, liabilities, and obligations of itself and insurance
companies under several different products liability policies. Id at 16. After looking
closely at the policy language, the court concluded that mere exposure did not result
in disease until the disease manifested itself in the commonly understood way. Id at
115. The First Circuit noted that experts testified that over 90% of all urban dwellers
have some asbestos-related scarring, but only a tiny percentage of those will ever
develop clinical asbestosis. Id. The court then concluded that "it is difficult to con-
sider subclinical insults to the lung to constitute an 'injury' when these insults do not
cause 'loss, pain, distress, or impairment' until, if ever, they accumulate to become
clinically evident or manifest." Id at 19 (citing Webster's Third New International Dic-
tionaty (3d ed. 1966)).
144. d. at 23. The First Circuit explained that its adoption of the manifestation
theory was grounded on the text of the policies themselves, and was supported by
medical evidence. Id In addition, the Eagle-hcher court observed that its conclusion
was supported by the generally accepted rule of insurance policy construction that
the insurance policy must be strictly construed to favor the injured. Id. at 23.
The First Circuit also pointed out that the case before it differed factually from
Forty-Eight, but noted that to the extent the Forty-Eight court was "influenced by the
• . .principle of maximizing coverage," it would have difficulty rejecting the result
reached by the First Circuit in Eagle-Picher. Id
For a fuller discussion of the Eagle-Picher decision, see Note, Asbestos-Related Dis-
eases Trigger Insurer's Duty to Defend and Indemnify When the Diseases Become Reasonably
Capable of Medical Diagnoses, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1335.
145. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
146. Id at 1034. The Keene court noted that the language of each policy at issue
provided that an "injury" and not the "occurrence" of that injury would trigger the
coverage. Id. at 1040. The court indicated that the difference between an asbestos-
related disease and a normal injury was that in the former the occurrence-the in-
halation which causes the injury-might take place substantially before the manifes-
tation of the ultimate injury, which might be asbestosis, lung cancer, or
mesothelioma. The language of the policies at issue, the Keene court concluded, did
not indicate a preference for either the exposure or manifestation theory. Id at 1043.
The court pointed out that if manifestation were the sole trigger of coverage, the
defendant would be insured only for a marginal amount of its asbestos-related injury
liability. Id at 1045-46. Furthermore, the court observed that once insurance com-
panies realized that asbestos had a high probability of causing disease, they ceased
issuing policies that adequately covered asbestos-related diseases. Id at 1045. Conse-
quently, the court said if it were to hold that manifestation alone triggers coverage,
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unclear what direction legislatures and other courts will take on this issue.
Whatever the resolution of this insurance coverage problem, it is apparent
that public policy will play an important role in resolving an issue which is
plaguing the manufacturers of toxic products and their insurers.
1 4 7
Partially due to uncertainty in the law, 148 product liability insurance
rates increased rather suddenly, beginning in 1974.149 At approximately the
same time, some insurers eliminated product liability insurance as it was the
riskiest type of insurance.' 50 Consequently, it became difficult for manufac-
the insurance companies would have to bear only a fraction of Keene's total liability
for asbestos-related disease. The Keene court therefore interpreted "injury" to mean
any part of the single injurious process that asbestos-related diseases entail, including
both exposure and manifestation. Id at 1045-46. For a description of the develop-
ment of asbestosis, see note 15 supra. Holding that both exposure and manifestation
would trigger coverage, the court maintained that each insurer was liable in full,
subject to the "other insurance provisions" within its contract. 667 F.2d at 1047.
Since it was likely that more than one insurance policy would be triggered and since
each insurer was fully liable, the court concluded that the manufacturer in Keene
could not collect more than it owed in damages. Id. at 1050. However, when more
than one insurance policy applied to a loss, the court held that the insurance compa-
nies could apportion according to the scheme provided by their "other insurance"
provisions. Id
147. McGovern, supra note 10, at 55 (footnotes omitted). Professor McGovern
has noted, in resolving disputes among manufacturers and insurers, a high value has
been placed upon the public policy concerns of fairness, administrative feasibility,
certainty, availability of future insurance coverage, and the potential complexity and
amount of future litigation. Id.
148. Hollenshead, supra note 21, at 84. See also Shea, supra note 131, at 578. As
courts expanded the liability of manufacturers for defective products, product liabil-
ity coverage became increasingly difficult to underwrite. Hollenshead, supra note 21,
at 84.
149. Id The following statistics demonstrate the magnitude of the increase in
products liability rates during the 1970's:
Companies with annual sales of less than $2.5 million reported average in-
creases of 432%. Certain industries were also particularly hard hit. Phar-
maceutical companies, for example, reported rate increases averaging 429%
and the increases for manufacturers of medical equipment were even
higher. In one year the average rates for manufacturers of metal castings
increased 165%. Manufacturers of power lawn mowers, industrial chemi-
cals, sporting goods, and ladders also had extraordinary rate increases.
Id. (citing INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT III
55-56). See also Shea, supra note 131, at 578.
Experts do not agree about the reason for the rise in cost of products liability
insurance. Hollenshead, supra, at 84. Some assert that it is a reaction to progressive
courts' broadening theories of liability. Id. Others suggest that the insurance price
increase could be a result of the general pressure of inflation, an increase in consum-
ers' awareness of their rights, and an increasingly effective plaintiffs' bar. Id For a
discussion of the relationship between products liability statutes of limitations and
rising insurance costs, see note 100 and accompanying text supra.
150. Hollenshead, supra note 21, at 85. Robert Hunter, Federal Insurance Ad-
ministrator, has suggested one plausible theory as to why the insurance rates shot up
suddenly in 1974. Id at 84-85. Hunter's theory is based on the stock market activity
in 1974:
In 1974 the stock market dropped, lowering the value of assets held by in-
surance companies. Each insurance company has a "capacity"-that is, the
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turing companies to obtain adequate coverage.' 15 By the late 1970's, both
insurers and manufacturers were insisting that there was a crisis in providing
insurance for product liability. In response to this concern, the Ford Admin-
istration set up an Interagency Task Force under the direction of the United
States Department of Commerce to study the problems caused by products
liability claims. 152 The Task Force Report, issued in 1977, concluded that a
serious insurance problem did exist, and cited as evidence for this conclusion
the fact that between 1974 and 1976 product liability insurance premiums
had risen substantially, particularly for industries associated with industrial
machinery, industrial chemicals, and high risk consumer goods. 153 Further-
more, the Task Force found that the problem of rising insurance costs was
more acute for smaller firms, some of which were conducting business with-
out any form of product liability insurance. 154 The Task Force also noted
that concern over increasing insurance costs had delayed the introduction of
new products into the market and had caused industries to spend more time
and effort developing liability-prevention techniques.' 55 However, the Task
Force concluded that there was no actual "crisis" per se in the insurance
market, since a large sector of manufacturers was able to obtain some prod-
ucts liability insurance.i56
Since the publication of the Task Force Report, the federal government
has been actively studying the insurance problem.1 57 Many in the insurance
amount of insurance it can write safely is a multiple of the value of the
surplus assets it holds. So when the assets of all insurers drop in value, the
capacity of the industry as a whole drops. Up until 1974 most product
liability insurance was written as a part of a general comprehensive liability
policy, and the rates for that specific coverage were closely scrutinized. But
in 1974 insurers with lowered capacity, looking to drop some of their busi-
ness because they were over-extended, separated out product liability be-
cause it was the riskiest line of insurance around. Thus, the rest is classic
supply-and-demand economics. Supply descreases, price rises.
Id
151. Id
152. Comment, State Legislative Restrictions, supra note 83, at 619. The Task
Force issued its final report in 1977. See U.S. DEPT. OF COM., INTERAGENCY TASK
FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT (1977) [hereinafter cited as INTER-
AGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT].
153. Comment, Stale Legislative Restrictions, supra note 83, at 619-20.
154. Id at 620.
155. Id
156. Id The Task Force also concluded that rising insurance rates were not the
result of adverse products liability decisions, but rather were a reaction to subjective
data bases used by insurers in setting premiums. Thus, the rising insurance rates
were slightly irrational reactions to horror stories concerning products liability. Id
See Johnson, supra note 73, at 678-79. See also INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 152, at 1-24; Hollenshead, supra note 21, at 84.
157. Hollenshead, supra note 21, at 90-93. Congress has also responded to this
issue. Numerous bills have been introduced in Congress since 1977 dealing with in-
surance problems posed by toxic torts. For example, a bill was passed by Congress
and signed by President Carter as part of the Tax Reduction Act of 1978 which uses
the tax code to encourage self-insurance. Id at 91. This bill essentially allows busi-
nesses to set up a product liability loss reserve fund and make tax deductible contri-
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field fear that the problems of insurance underwriting will become even
more complex if enterprise or industry-wide liability becomes an accepted
theory of recovery,158 and it has been argued that the Sindell decision will
force each insurer to assume a portion of the risks of an entire industry dur-
ing the period of its policy coverage.' 59
VII. CONCLUSION
The four major issues discussed above in this Comment-identification
of defendants, 16° statutes of limitation and repose, 16 1 collateral estoppel,
162
and insurance 163-are merely the crest of the on-coming wave of problems
that can be anticipated in the products liability area in the coming de-
cades.1 64 These issues, when squarely faced in pending toxic tort suits, will
spur reform of the substantive law of products liability.165 Furthermore, pro-
butions to it. Id. In September 1981, President Reagan signed a bill allowing the
creation of "risk retention groups" which can purchase product liability insurance on
a group basis from commercial insurers or establish their own captive insurance com-
panies without government regulation. Id. at 92-93. In January 1982, the National
Association of Wholesaler-Distributors announced that it would form the first risk
retention group and would become chartered in Bermuda. Id. See also Comment,
Solving the Products Liability Insurance Crisis." A Study of the Role of Economic Theory in the
Legislative Reform Process, 31 MERCER L. REV. 755, 767-71 (1980).
158. Vagley & Blanton, supra note 14, at 655-56. These two commentators have
noted as follows:
Widespread application of enterprise liability coupled with market share
apportionment of damages or not, would complicate the manifestation-ex-
posure controversy even more . . . . The result of such a standard in the
underlying tort suit could be to hold an insurer liable under the insurance
contract even when the manufacturer he insures has not, in fact, caused the
particular injury. This might effectively make each insurer the insurer of
an entire industry during the period its policy covers a particular
manufacturer.
Id.
159. Id. at 656.
160. For a discussion of identification of defendant problems, see notes 20-82
and accompanying text supra.
161. For a discussion of problems with statutes of limitations and statutes of
repose, see notes 83-102 and accompanying text supra.
162. For a discussion of the problem of collateral estoppel in toxic tort cases, see
notes 103-120 and accompanying text supra.
163. For a discussion of the insurance problems encountered in latent disease
and injury cases, see notes 129-59 and accompanying text supra.
164. Other problems include the interaction between no-fault workers' compen-
sation systems and products liability insurance, the award for punitive damages, and
the use of the collateral source award. For a discussion of these problems, see Com-
ment, Aligning Policy with Theory." The Uniform Product Liability Act's Apportionment of
Responsibility in Product Liability Actions, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 162, 176-78 (1980); Com-
ment, The Uniform Product Liability Act. Lowering the Cost of Product Liability Actions, 49
U. CIN. L. REv. 187, 197 & 201 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, UPLAI. Addi-
tionally, the extent to which a court should rely on hindsight-that is, judging yester-
day's design choice on the basis of today's knowledge of hazards-is an interesting
issue. See Henderson, Coping, supra note 90, at 930-31 (1981).
165. One author notes that Judge Harry A. Takiff of the Philadelphia Court of
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cedural law in this area will have to be adjusted to accommodate the enor-
mous mechanical and economic difficulties of toxic tort case
management. 1
66
Given the confusion of the current state of the law regarding toxic torts,
it is not surprising that considerable attention has been given to the possibil-
ity of federal legislation to alleviate the toxic tort problem. 167 However,
there is great hesitancy among experts to support federal intrusion into what
has traditionally been controlled by the states' common law. 168 Advocates
of federal legislation counter that national uniformity in this area is both
necessary and desirable.'
69
Common Pleas, who presides over many asbestos suits, has stressed the need for re-
form in this area:
The asbestos dilemma for the court system, Takiff says, is largely a matter
of too much: too many suits that are too expensive and too time-consum-
ing, too many defendants, too many complex legal and medical issues, too
few settlements compared to other civil cases, and too much paper filed.
In short, he says, "unless there is a dramatic change in what has been
the experience in settling these cases, the present judicial system cannot
cope. And it won't for the foreseeable future."
Riebstein, supra note 80, at 37. Judge Takiff tried to alleviate the backup of asbestos
suits clogging the court system by eliminating jury trials for asbestos suits until the
appeal stage. Id The Pennsylvania Supreme Court halted his program, though it
has not yet finally ruled on it. Id
166. Id
167. See Henderson, Manufacturer's Liabih'ty for Defective Product Design." A Proposed
Statutoqy Reform, 56 N.C.L. REv. 625 (1978).
168. See Henderson, supra note 167, at 628. For example, it has been observed
that
[t]o attempt to transform products liability into a comprehensive body of
federal law would present a very difficult drafting task and would, assuming
general federal question jurisdiction in the district courts, thrust an enor-
mous potential burden upon a federal judiciary already hardpressed to
meet current demands for their attention.
Id. at 628. Other reasons have also been advanced to discourage the adoption of
federal legislation in the area:
First, tort law is an area that has traditionally been left to the states, and a
federal law of torts would significantly affect the balance of power between
the states and the federal government. Second, a federal tort law would
fossilize the law-precluding state diversity and experimentation towards
improving the law. Third, as an area of law that involves fundamental
decisions about fairness and equity, tort law is best left to a unit of govern-
ment that is closer to the people. Fourth, product liability law should be
left to the courts and should not be dealt with by statute, either federal or
state.
Hollenshead, supra note 21, at 78.
169. Hollenshead, supra note 21, at 78. Those who favor federal legislation ar-
gue that
the flow of products across the country makes product liability an interstate
problem. Insurance rates are set nationally, and principles of conservation
may lead insurers to base their rates on the least favorable law to which a
manufacturer might find itself subject. Furthermore, small states are nearly
helpless to protect their own manufacturers, when the products are likely to
end up in a different jurisdiction. As a Georgia Senate committee report
stated, "until these states (California, New York, New Jersey, Illinois ...)
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The move for federal reform was led by the United States Commerce
Department and an Interagency Task Force headed by Professor Victor E.
Schwartz from 1976-1981.170 This Task Force developed the Model Uni-
form Product Liability Act (UPLA),1 71 which was published in its final form
in October 1979.172 The Task Force also issued a report which contained
statistics, surveys and a seven volume legal study conducted during the prep-
aration of the Act. 173 This report has become a main source of data for later
product liability law reformers. 174 For example, Republican Senator Kas-
ton of Wisconsin introduced a bill on June 16, 1982, which traced much of
its origin back to the UPLA. 175 However, the UPLA has generated a great
deal of criticism and its critics have commented that the UPLA, like all
products of legislative compromise, is likely to attract few followers.
176
Therefore, it appears unlikely that the UPLA or any other currently pro-
posed uniform law in the products liability area will be easily accepted by
Congress. Unfortunately, it may also be quite some time before individual
states or courts get around to developing a coherent and equitable legal
formula for handling the explosive toxic tort problem in a uniform fashion.
While federal legislation is not the panacea for all ills in the judicial
system, uniform legislation could be advantageous to the products liability
field. First, legislatures would have the advantage of drafting a law from
have brought stability to their legal system, significant tort modification in
Georgia will have little or no beneficial effect." (footnote omitted). Finally,
the states have done nothing so far to bring uniformity to the law, even
since the publication of the UPLA, and proponents of federal action ob-
serve that state legislative reforms have virtually come to a standstill.
Id.
170. Id at 94. For a further discussion of the role of this Interagency Task Force
see notes 152-56 and accompanying text supra.
171. 44 Fed. Reg. 62, 714 (1979).
172. Hollenshead, supra note 21 at 94. For a discussion of the Act, see Reibstein,
The Model Uniform Products Liability Act." Pinning Down Products Law, 46 J. AIR L. &
COM., 349 (1980-81).
173. Reibstein, supra note 172, at 349.
174. Id.
175. Hollenshead, supra note 21, at 77 n.8. For discussions of proposed federal
legislation, see generally Freedman, Commentary: Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 15
FORUM 697 (1979-80); Henderson, The Model Uniform Product Liabihty Act, 3 CORP. L.
REV. 242 (1980); Owen, Restructuring Product Liabihty Law, 16 TRIAL 58 (Nov. 1980);
Note, Proposed Federal Products Liabity Legislation: A Summary and Analysis, 104J. Prod
L., (June 1982); Schwartz, Administration Initiatives to Address the Product Liability Reme-
dies That Meet the Problem's Causes, 16 FORUM 711 (1980-81); Schwartz, The Uniform
Product Liability Act, 33 VAND. L. REV. 579 (1980); Special Project-The Model Uniform
Product Liabiity Act, 47 J. AIR L. & COM. 347 (1981); Comment, Restrictions on Liability:
Defenses Under the Uniform Product Liabilty Act, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 141 (1980); Com-
ment, UPLA, supra note 164; Note, Various Risk Allocation Schemes Under the Model Uni-
form Product Liability Act. An Analysis of the Statute of Repose, Corporate Fault Principles, and
the Conflicting Social Policies Arising from Workplace Product Injuries, 48 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 588 (1980); Note, Product Liability Reform Proposals in Washington-A Public Policy
Analysis, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 143 (1980).
176. See, e.g., Note, Product Liabiity Reform and the Model Uniform Product Liability
Act, 60 NEB. L. REV. 50 (1981).
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scratch, developing new theories which are appropriate for the modern
problems encountered in toxic tort cases, instead of bending and twisting old
inappropriate theories to reach a desired result. 77 Secondly, a uniform law
would eliminate the potential for forum-shopping in much the same way the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act has attempted to do in the area of
domestic law. 178 Finally, predictability and uniformity in toxic tort deci-
sions would not only have economic advantages for product manufacturers,
insurance companies, and the court system, but would have the advantage of
assuring equal treatment of plaintiffs no matter what their domicile.'
79
Jeanne Crane Castafero
177. For an example of courts' attempts to analogize toxic tort problems to
traditional products liability law, see notes 42-56 and accompanying text supra.
178. For a full discussion of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, see
Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: .4 Legislative Remedy for Children
Caught tn the Confli of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (1969).
179. Uncertainty in products liability law has been blamed, at least in part, for
the increase in insurance rates which began in 1974. See notes 148-56 and accompa-
nying text supra.
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